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Abstract 
 Auditors protect our capital markets by assuming a stakeholder interest role of 
constraining aggressive, client-preferred financial reporting; in order to profitably operate as a 
business, however, they also must undertake a commercial role of acquiring or retaining 
profitable clients. In this dissertation, I examine and report the results of two experiments, testing 
whether the salience of auditors’ professional role identities (stakeholder interest versus 
commercial) and client importance (lower versus higher) interact to jointly influence decisions 
about client financial reporting. Drawing on research in psychology, I predict and find that 
seasoned audit partners, compared to lower-ranked audit seniors, allow more aggressive client 
accounting recognition when a commercial versus stakeholder interest role identity is salient, but 
only when serving clients of lower importance. Audit partners with a salient stakeholder interest 
role identity request more conservative client accounting recognition regardless of client 
importance level. When the stakes of making an incorrect decision are lower (i.e., lower client 
importance), identity-related information processing biases are more likely to manifest, yet as 
decision stakes increase (i.e., higher client importance), accuracy motivations attenuate the 
identity effects. In addition, I find that audit partners treat the paired decision of accounting 
recognition and financial statement disclosure transparency (collectively, financial reporting) 
differently depending on client importance level. Specifically, audit partners request more 
conservative accounting recognition, but allow less financial statement disclosure transparency, 
particularly when client importance is higher. A comparison of audit partner and audit senior 
judgments reveals that, expectedly, lower-ranked audit seniors are not as influenced by 
professional role identity and client importance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Auditors protect our capital markets by assuming a stakeholder interest role of 
constraining client management tendencies to use aggressive financial reporting that materially 
fails to conform to GAAP (SEC 2000).
1
 In order to profitably operate as a business, however, 
auditors must balance their stakeholder interest role with a commercial role of executing their 
business model, which involves attracting, landing, and retaining profitable clients (Zeff 2003; 
Knechel 2007; Malsch and Gendron 2013). Researchers and regulators have long expressed 
concerns over auditor allowance of more aggressive, client-preferred financial reporting due to 
their preoccupation with commercial motivations (e.g., SEC 2000; Harris 2016). Auditors 
develop identities based on the roles they assume within their accounting firm. Whereas lower-
ranking audit seniors do not routinely engage in commercial activities of the firm, seasoned audit 
partners, for example, have likely developed commercial and stakeholder interest identities due 
to their roles as audit executives. However, empirical evidence is lacking about whether the 
judgments of highly experienced audit professionals are subject to identity-related information 
processing biases. 
By providing such evidence in this dissertation, I examine whether the salience of audit 
partners’ professional role identities (stakeholder interest versus commercial) and client 
importance (lower versus higher) interact to jointly influence auditor judgments and decisions 
about aggressive, client-preferred financial reporting. Prior research finds that prompting a 
professional identity, in a stakeholder interest sense, causes relatively inexperienced auditors to 
                                                 
1
 Prior research related to stakeholder theory defines stakeholders in various ways (Clarkson 1995; Asher, Mahoney, 
and Mahoney 2005). This dissertation defines stakeholders as those individuals or groups that rely on management’s 
objective financial reporting of the firm for resource allocation and formal and informal contracting (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Healy and Palepu 2001; Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner 2010). Thus, 
in this dissertation, stakeholders include shareholders, board members, option holders, debt holders (e.g., banks, 
bondholders), employees, customers, suppliers, and regulators. 
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judge aggressive client-preferred financial reporting less favorably (King 2002; Bauer 2015). In 
contrast to junior auditors, audit partners are most directly responsible for dispatching audits of 
sufficient quality as well as executing a business model of landing and retaining profitable 
clients. Although audit partners routinely engage in both commercial and stakeholder interest 
roles, we know little about how identities formed as a result of engaging these roles influence 
how the partners think about and decide on the acceptability of client financial reporting. It could 
be that audit partners tend to permit more aggressive accounting when environmental cues 
activate a commercial identity. Further, there is not a clear understanding of whether decisions 
made under stakeholder interest or commercial identities change as the underlying client 
importance changes (encompassing current and future client audit fees, client size, and client 
visibility). 
 Although prior audit research suggests that the presence of a single (stakeholder interest) 
professional identity influences relatively inexperienced auditor judgments (Bamber and Iyer 
2007; Bauer 2015), I expect that audit executives form multiple professional identities due to the 
different roles they undertake routinely as accounting executives (e.g., sales-driven commercial 
identity and stakeholder interest identity). Complementing prior research, I examine the 
influence of professional role identity salience within individual executive-level auditors at two 
levels of client importance. Both identity salience and incentives related to client importance are 
important drivers of behavior, yet little is known about their joint influence. 
 Based on identity theory and motivated reasoning, I predict that audit partners are more 
likely to permit management preferred, aggressive accounting when a commercial role identity 
versus stakeholder interest role identity is salient, but only when serving clients of relatively 
lower versus higher importance. When the decision stakes of drawing an incorrect conclusion are 
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lower (e.g., when client importance is lower), identity effects are more likely to manifest. Yet, as 
the decision stakes of drawing an inappropriate conclusion increase (e.g., when client importance 
is higher), I propose, based on motivated reasoning theory, that audit partners will develop 
accuracy goals and engage in more effortful cognitive processing, attenuating the identity effects 
(Kunda 1990). In other words, audit partners are more likely to be subject to identity-related 
information processing biases when the decision stakes of drawing an incorrect decision are 
lower. Although my theory applies to audit partners’ judgments and decisions, I examine in 
supplemental analyses audit seniors’ judgments and decisions as a counterfactual test to better 
understand whether or not lower-ranking audit seniors develop similar identities. 
 It is important to examine audit partners in testing for the joint influence of professional 
role identity and client importance in particular because the experiential contexts associated with 
selling services or constraining aggressive accounting, or even the salience of costs and benefits 
of serving clients of differing importance, typically do not manifest at lower-level auditor ranks 
(Shaub and Lawrence 1996).
2
 Despite theory supporting this assertion, there is considerable a 
priori tension that warrants an empirical-experimental test. One often overlooked consideration 
is that audit partners are not randomly selected from auditors at lower-level ranks to become 
audit executives of their respective firms. Indeed, the base rate percentage of audit seniors who 
proceed to become audit executives is estimated to be small.
3
 Further, while audit seniors and 
                                                 
2
 In supplemental analyses, I compare the judgments and decisions of audit partners to lower-ranking audit seniors 
(i.e., 3-5 year professionals) by administering an experimental instrument nearly identical to the current study to 143 
practicing audit seniors. Although, as discussed later, I find a marginally significant three-way interaction of auditor 
rank x professional role identity x client importance, I find no statistically significant interaction of professional role 
identity x client importance or main effects on client accounting aggressiveness at the lower-level audit senior ranks. 
This finding is expected given audit seniors’ differing role within the accounting firm, focusing primarily on 
dispatching audits in accordance with professional standards rather than also routinely engaging in a commercial 
role of selling services. 
3
 One recent informal estimate suggests that only 2% or less of audit staff will become audit partners (BreakingBig4 
2014). Perhaps more revealing, only an estimated 17% of Big 4 audit senior managers with nine to 13 years of 
experience can be expected to become audit partners (Newquist 2011). 
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others at lower ranks have been shown to revise their decision processes when prompted with a 
stakeholder interest identity, the decision processes of more experienced auditors, especially 
those of audit executives, may be fairly immune to the effects of such prompts. Craig (1992) 
implies that, since audit partners have years of daily exposure to different professional pressures 
and accountabilities to parties with divergent preferences, their decision processes may become 
focused on identifying the right answer with little regard to what particular professional identities 
or economic pressures are salient in a given decision context. Further, as Hobson, Mayew, 
Peecher, and Venkatachalam (2015) show, auditors have different learned incentives and 
behaviors depending on levels of experience. As such, the pattern of findings observed in prior 
research using lower-ranking auditors and different operational versions of the constructs I 
examine herein arguably will not generalize to how these constructs jointly influence the 
decision processes of seasoned audit executives. 
 To test my hypothesis, I conduct an experiment using a 2 x 2 between-subjects design. I 
manipulate professional role identity salience and client importance (see Figure 1, Panel A). I 
manipulate professional role identity salience by prompting participants to write down thoughts 
about either winning or retaining an important client (commercial) or standing up to an 
aggressive client due to professional responsibility (stakeholder interest). I manipulate client 
importance by informing participants that their audit firm is (is not) the preferred assurance 
provider to the client’s private equity (hereafter “PE”) firm owner.4 
 I test my theory within the PE setting because it enables me to readily capture clients of 
differential importance and provides a critical and unique opportunity for commercial incentives 
                                                 
4
 A private equity firm is defined in this dissertation as an organizational form that engages in leveraged buyout 
investments and other activities by raising capital through private equity funds. Prominent private equity firms 
include KKR, Blackstone, and Carlyle. Refer to Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) for additional information about the 
private equity organizational structure. 
5 
 
 
to permeate audit partners’ judgments without the risk of sanctions from the regulator over 
public company audits (PCAOB). Being the “preferred provider” of assurance services to a PE 
firm presents considerably higher current and future economic benefits to audit partners and 
firms. Not only are PE firms highly coveted auditor clients, but also the PE organization form as 
a whole continues to be the target of increased criticism from regulators and investors for 
engaging in aggressive financial reporting (Bowden 2014; Morgenson 2015). For example, the 
SEC inspected approximately 150 PE firms and found aggressive or misleading financial 
reporting in more than 50% of those firms (Bowden 2014).
5
 Furthermore, popular press 
highlighted similar investor concerns that PE firms often engage in opaque financial reporting 
(Morgenson 2015).
6
 Despite absence of audit research, an estimated 13,000 private companies 
are held within portfolios of approximately 3,800 PE firms in the United States (Private Equity 
Growth Capital Council 2015), an ownership form that has grown in investment from $0.4 
trillion worldwide in 2001 to over $3.8 trillion in 2014.
7
 
In my experiment, audit partners review a legal loss contingency scenario and respond to 
three dependent variables that measure their acceptance of client-preferred financial reporting. In 
doing so, audit partners determine the likelihood of requesting management to accrue (i.e., 
“book”) a liability, the relative amount of the liability to record, and the likelihood of requesting 
management to disclose more “beyond compliance” details about the nature of the contingency 
                                                 
5
 Examples of financial reporting issues observed by SEC inspectors include improper expense allocation, hiding 
advisor fees, and overstating values in PE marketing and valuation materials (Bowden 2014).  
6
 The NYT reported that a PE fund owned by KKR disclosed a $38.6 million expense buried in the footnotes on 
page 35 of 37 in the 2014 annual report, noting that the obligation would be paid to KKR out of “realization 
proceeds applicable to the fund” upon sale of fund investments rather than presenting it as a net expense in the 
fund’s financial statements. 
7
 In comparison, there were approximately 6,900 and 5,600 listed companies with a total market capitalization of 
$14.6 trillion and $27.9 trillion in 2001 and 2014, respectively, among the NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges combined 
(SIFMA 2015). As a percentage of private equity and public companies, private equity grew from 2.7% in 2001 to 
12.0% in 2014.  
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in the financial statement footnotes.
8
 In all conditions, management expresses a strong preference 
to record no accrual and to disclose the fewest details in the footnotes. 
 Results are consistent with my predictions. Audit partners with a more salient 
commercial versus stakeholder interest professional role identity allow less conservative client 
accounting recognition, but only when client importance is lower versus higher. Further, audit 
partners with a salient stakeholder interest professional role identity request more conservative 
accounting recognition, regardless of the level of client importance. In additional analyses, I 
examine whether audit partners tend to substitute accounting recognition and expanded financial 
statement disclosure.  I do not find evidence to suggest that auditors generally substitute more 
conservative accounting recognition for requesting management to disclose more “beyond 
compliance” details about the nature of the contingency in the financial statement footnotes. 
Rather, it appears audit partners treat the paired decision of accounting recognition and expanded 
financial statement disclosure differently depending on levels of client importance. Specifically, 
audit partners request more conservative accounting recognition, but allow less financial 
statement disclosure transparency, particularly when client importance is higher. 
 I also find judgment process evidence supporting my theory. Consistent with the 
expectation that audit partners develop distinct identities given their differing roles as accounting 
executives, an administered post-experimental questionnaire confirmed that audit partner 
participants assessed their own personal attributes, beliefs, and qualities as an accounting 
professional (collectively, “professional identity”) to be more commercial or more stakeholder 
interest in nature when primed with environmental cues of each respective professional role 
identity. I also find that audit partners perceive the stakes or consequences involved in drawing 
                                                 
8
 Prior research in accounting has examined auditor “book or waive” decisions or the likelihood an auditor would 
“require” management to adjust their accounting. I use the term “request” to be consistent with applicable auditing 
standards, particularly, ISA 450: Evaluation of Misstatements Identified during the Audit. 
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an incorrect conclusion to be greater when serving clients of higher importance, and that they 
engage in more cognitive effort when deliberating about a course of action. These findings are 
consistent with motivated reasoning theory (Kunda 1990), suggesting that motivations to be 
more accurate in decision-making, combined with more careful cognitive consideration, 
attenuates identity-related information processing biases. 
 My dissertation makes several contributions to both research and practice. One, I extend 
prior psychological research on the multifaceted nature of identities (Markus and Kunda 1986; 
LeBeouf, Shafir, and Belyavsky Bayuk 2010). Building on motivated reasoning theory, I show 
that identity effects manifest in very experienced audit professionals when decision stakes are 
lower, but are attenuated when stakes or consequences of drawing an incorrect conclusion 
increase. Two, I provide evidence that audit partners reach different decisions depending on the 
salience of a stakeholder interest role identity and a commercial role identity, two roles that audit 
partners routinely assume as accounting executives. Thus, auditors do not always think and make 
decisions under a single professional identity, as largely assumed in prior research at least, using 
considerably less experienced participants (King 2002; Bauer 2015). This dissertation also has 
implications for audit practitioners and regulators, as I demonstrate the importance of 
maintaining a stakeholder interest professional identity, particularly when serving clients of 
lower importance level to the audit firm. Counter to regulator fears that auditors permit clients to 
engage in more aggressive financial reporting primarily when serving clients of higher 
importance level, I find that higher client importance can be a mechanism that actually reduces 
commercial identity effects. Nevertheless, I do find that simply asking audit partners to write 
about winning or retaining an important client increases their tendency to permit more aggressive 
client financial reporting in some contexts (i.e., when client importance is lower). This finding 
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suggests that identity effects could have a subtle influence on auditor judgments, depending on 
how easily a commercial identity is activated. 
 Three, the current dissertation builds on prior research by examining how auditors treat 
accounting recognition and expanded financial statement disclosure (Griffin 2014). Specifically, 
in an ambiguous decision setting, I find no evidence to suggest that audit partners generally view 
more conservative accounting recognition and expanded financial statement disclosure as 
substitutes. However, it appears that audit partners do treat the paired decision of accounting 
recognition and expanded financial statement disclosure differently depending on levels of client 
importance. Specifically, while audit partners request more conservative accounting recognition, 
they allow less transparent financial statement disclosure, particularly for clients of higher 
importance. Finally, this dissertation provides a better understanding of how the expanding, but 
understudied, PE organizational form and its operating environments influence experienced 
auditors (Financial Services Authority 2006; Cumming, Siegel, and Wright 2007; Wright, 
Gilligan, and Amess 2009).  
 The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Section II explains the theory 
and hypothesis. Sections III and IV describe the experimental method and the results, 
respectively. Section V describes supplemental analyses, and section VI provides discussion and 
concluding comments. 
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II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS   
Professional Role Identities 
 “Individuals possess many different identities, and the same individual may make vastly 
different decisions depending on which identity is relatively more salient” (Bauer 2015, 99). 
Identity salience is the extent that an identity is at the forefront of an individual’s mind, and the 
salience increases with the presence and intensity of a particular identity’s cues or attributes 
(Forehand, Deshpande, and Reed 2002; Bauer 2015). Even though individuals often have many 
different identities, the more salient identity at a particular decision point influences behaviors 
(Ashforth, Harrison, and Terry 2008; Bauer 2015). 
 Prior identity research in accounting examined client identity and professional identity 
(i.e., the extent to which an auditor identifies with norms, goals, and values of their client and, 
respectively, of the accounting profession) and suggests that increasing the salience or strength 
of either identity influences judgments and decision making of auditors (Bamber and Iyer 2007, 
Suddaby, Gendron, and Lam 2009; Bauer 2015; and Koch and Salterio 2015). Specifically, 
auditors tend to permit client-preferred, aggressive accounting more when their client identities 
are stronger, but less when their professional identities are stronger or more salient (King 2002; 
Bauer 2015; Bamber and Iyer 2007). I posit that, relative to inexperienced auditors, the 
professional identity is more complex for more experienced auditors; multiple identities within 
the professional context develop and evolve as auditors encounter particular clients and 
circumstances.  
 Audit partners form identities over time based on the unique roles they assume as 
executives, which likely include both a stakeholder interest role (i.e., being skeptical, protecting 
others' interests, and maintaining independence) and a commercial role identity (i.e., maintaining 
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good client relationships, maintaining profitability, and growing the profession) (Anderson-
Gough, Grey, and Robson 2001; Gendron 2001, 2002; Barrett, Cooper, and Jamal 2005; 
Suddaby et al. 2009; Gendron and Spira 2010; Kornberger, Justesen, and Mouritsen 2011; 
Malsch and Gendron 2013). Given prior identity research, audit executives’ judgments and 
decisions likely depend on whether a stakeholder interest or commercial role identity is relatively 
more salient at the time of the decision. In general, audit partners would likely request more 
conservative client accounting when a stakeholder interest role identity is salient compared to 
when a commercial role identity is salient. 
Importance of Client to Audit Firm 
 The construct of client importance is multi-faceted; it captures benefits in the form of fees 
and career advancement as well as reputation-related risks that come with greater client size and 
client visibility. Although higher importance may lead to the development of directional goals of 
appeasing management to retain current and future client fees, it may also increase the perceived 
risks or consequences of making an incorrect decision. This would, in turn, increase audit 
partners’ motivations to be accurate in their decision-making. I argue that higher client 
importance increases the stakes or consequences (both positive and negative) of making an 
incorrect decision (e.g., motivations to be accurate). 
 The theory of economic dependence suggests that auditors are more prone to be 
acquiescent to managements’ financial reporting demands for the reason of earning higher 
current and future fees (Keune and Johnstone 2012). As fees increase, auditors face greater 
future at-risk income (DeAngelo 1981; Simunic 1984), which pressures auditors to permit 
aggressive financial reporting (Wright and Wright 1997; Nelson, Elliott, Tarpley, and Gibbins 
2002; Keune and Johnstone 2012). Other research proposes, however, that the potential costs of 
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a particular decision become more salient as client importance increases. For example, Keune 
and Johnstone (2012, 1646) point out that “the theory of reputation protection suggests that 
auditors value their reputations, identify risks posed by their clients, and respond by exerting 
effort (Bedard and Johnstone 2004) so as to protect their reputations and reduce litigation risk 
(Stice 1991; Lys and Watts 1994; Johnstone and Bedard 2001).” As clients become more 
important, auditors experience greater reputational risk due to increased visibility, thus leading to 
less willingness to allow management to engage in aggressive financial reporting. In summary, 
the perceived personal decision stakes or consequences (both upside and downside) to the audit 
partner related to client financial reporting are higher when client importance increases. 
 The PE setting provides a critical opportunity for commercial incentives to permeate 
audit partners’ judgments and decisions. For instance, in a typical auditor-client relationship, an 
auditor serves one client who is controlled by one or more owners. In the typical PE setting, 
however, an auditor serves one or more clients who are controlled by one common owner (or a 
group of common owners). This can aggregate to a substantial number of clients for the 
accounting firm if the auditor is the preferred assurance provider. Also, PE firms often acquire 
and divest of companies over, short finite time periods. Thus, auditors receive not only on-going 
fees for audits of PE portfolio companies, but also fees for merger and acquisition consultations, 
in addition to IPO fee opportunities when associated with PE firms. Clearly, landing or retaining 
a PE firm client with a preferred provider relationship is important to individual audit partners 
and their firms. Not only are there potential benefits to serving clients of higher importance, 
there are also potential costs. For example, PE clients of greater importance are larger in size and 
more visible, both attributes that relate to greater auditor litigation and reputational risk. Because 
clients of greater importance encompass potential benefits through current and future client fees 
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and potential costs through litigation and reputational risk, I expect that the stakes of making an 
incorrect decision are perceived to be greater as client importance increases. 
Moderating Effect of Client Importance on Professional Role Identities 
 Prior research in accounting suggests that auditors are subject to biased information 
processing when directional goals exist or when a strong client identity is present (Hackenbrack 
and Nelson 1996; Kadous, Kennedy, and Peecher 2003; Blay 2005; Suddaby et al. 2009; Bauer 
2015). In line with motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990), a salient professional role identity 
invokes directional goals to please a particular group or to support a preferred course of action 
through subconscious processing. At lower levels of client importance, auditors will likely focus 
on and act in favor of directional goals, which are shaped by the more salient professional role 
identity (either a stakeholder interest or commercial identity). Yet, as accuracy goals increase 
(i.e., in light of the positive and negative stakes of making an incorrect decision), participants 
will likely engage in deeper and more careful cognitive processing (McAllister, Mitchell, and 
Beach 1979; Tetlock 1985; Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994), stemming from accuracy goals, and 
typically lead to attenuation of directional goal processing biases (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 
1987; Mishra, Shiv, and Nayakankuppam 2008; Mishra, Mishra, Rixom, and Chatterjee 2013).  
As Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987, 313) suggest, “the more concerned the individual 
is with drawing an accurate inference, the more consistent data will be required to accept the 
hypothesis and the less inconsistent data will be required to reject the hypothesis.” Mishra et al. 
(2013) find that when individuals are motivated to be accurate about spending habits, they have 
difficulty generating spending justifications and thus save more compared to others without 
motivations to be accurate. In other words, they spend conservatively. Mishra et al. (2008) 
propose that activated accuracy goals tend to eliminate post-action optimism bias, which, in their 
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study, is a tendency to expect more favorable outcomes with vague information after taking an 
action instead of prior to doing so. Collectively, these studies advocate that deeper and more 
careful cognitive effort, coupled with accuracy goals will reduce the effects of a directional 
preference-consistent bias. Auditors concerned with accuracy goals strive to make the correct 
judgment, which is unknown ex-ante (Bonner 2008). However, due to GAAP, auditors who 
strive to be correct likely gravitate toward more conservative actions.  
In my experiment, I expect audit partners to allow the least conservative client accounting 
when a commercial identity is salient and client importance is lower compared to all other 
conditions. When client importance is higher, auditors will likely request more conservative 
accounting due to accuracy goals regardless of their activated professional role identity. Under 
lower client importance, auditors will be more likely to make decisions in line with the values of 
their activated professional role identity. Accordingly, this leads to the following hypothesis, as 
depicted in Panel A of Figure 1: 
 H1: Audit partners will allow the least conservative client accounting when 
 commercial identity is salient and client importance is lower, and request more 
 conservative client accounting when either stakeholder interest identity is salient 
 (regardless of client importance), or when commercial identity is salient and 
 client importance is higher. 
 
 H1 is not without tension, however. As Kunda (1990) points out, a deeper and more 
careful cognitive effort associated with accuracy goals could also lead the decision maker to 
create or reinforce justifications for desired conclusions. In other words, accuracy goals can 
exacerbate directional goal processing biases. For instance, Tetlock and Boettger (1989) found 
that accuracy goals exacerbated the dilution effect bias, due to more complex processing. Audit 
partners must be able to possess and access more appropriate reasoning strategies for accuracy 
goals to reduce bias. Thus, if deeper and more careful cognitive effort accompanying accuracy 
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goals exacerbate audit partners’ directional biases, then an alternative prediction would be that 
audit partners allow the least conservative client accounting when a commercial identity is 
salient and client importance is higher. 
The Relation between Recognition and Financial Statement Disclosure Transparency 
 Audit partners are charged with constraining management tendencies to use aggressive 
financial reporting. By definition, financial reporting encompasses both recognized amounts 
(e.g., accounting recognition) and financial statement footnote disclosures (e.g., transparency). 
While the FASB has indicated that financial statement disclosure is not a substitute for 
recognition, and that more useful information should be recognized (SFAC No. 5, FASB 1984), 
prior research (albeit limited) suggests that auditors tolerate greater potential misstatement in the 
financial statements when clients provide supplemental fair value disclosures (Griffin 2014).  
 The relation between accounting recognition and financial statement disclosure remains 
unclear, particularly when clients express a preference to neither recognize a liability nor include 
additional details beyond what are required for compliance purposes in the financial statements. 
For example, audit partners might push clients for more forthcoming financial statement footnote 
disclosure (above and beyond compliance requirements) in exchange for allowing less 
conservative liability recognition. Alternatively, because standards indicate information that is 
more useful should be recognized, audit partners might request more conservative liability 
recognition, yet allow less transparent financial statement footnote disclosure. Both of these 
financial reporting decisions could be conditional on client importance. That is, audit partners 
may provide more concessions, either by substituting transparency for recognition or allowing 
more lenient footnote disclosure, for clients of higher importance. As such, I explore four 
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research questions to better understand the relation between accounting recognition and 
expanded financial statement disclosure transparency. 
 RQ1A: Do audit partners request more transparent financial statement 
 disclosure, yet allow less conservative accounting recognition? 
 
 RQ1B: Conditional on client importance, do audit partners request more 
 transparent financial statement disclosure, yet allow less conservative 
 accounting recognition? 
 
 RQ2A: Do audit partners request more conservative accounting recognition, yet 
 allow less transparent financial statement disclosure? 
 
 RQ2B: Conditional on client importance, do audit partners request more 
 conservative accounting recognition, yet allow less transparent financial 
 statement disclosure? 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
Participants and Design  
 Fifty-three audit executives from U.S. accounting firms ranging in size from Big 4 to 
small local or regional firms participated in the experiment.
9
 Audit partner participants have, on 
average, 24 years of experience.
10
 Participants were recruited via email and telephone primarily 
through a contact person at each participating accounting firm or office location. The accounting 
firm contact person sent an introductory email, on my behalf, to prospective participants within 
their respective firm that included a hyperlink to a Qualtrics online instrument. Self-reported 
demographics indicate that 27 participants were from Big 4 audit firms, 15 from non-Big 4 
international audit firms, one from a national audit firm, and 10 from regional or local audit 
firms.
11
 
 To test my hypothesis, I conducted an experiment using a 2 x 2 between-subjects design. 
As explained more fully in the next section, I manipulated professional role identity salience and 
client importance (see Figure 1, Panel A). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
treatment groups. 
Task and Procedure 
 Upon study participation consent, auditors were asked to read brief background 
information. Next, participants encountered the professional role identity salience manipulation, 
as shown in Appendix A. As part of the manipulation, I asked participants to complete a thought 
                                                 
9
 Fifty-six audit executives completed the research instrument. Two participants were excluded for failing both a 
professional role identity comprehension check and a client importance comprehension check. One other participant 
was excluded from all analyses because tests (e.g., Cook’s Distance) revealed this participant as an outlier on most 
experimental measures. This participant also did not complete one of the dependent variables. Inferences are 
unchanged if the outlier is included and if the data from the two participants failing both comprehension checks are 
included in the analyses. 
10
 There were no significant differences between groups (p > 0.316). All participants are audit executives (e.g., 
opinion signing audit professionals) and highly experienced experts in their field. Therefore, any variation in years 
of experience at this level is not expected to influence judgments and decisions among subjects. 
11
 There were no significant differences between groups based on firm size (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.292). 
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exercise by taking two to three minutes to reflect on specific experiences in their professional 
career. Participants in the Commercial professional role identity condition were to consider the 
following: “As you look back on your career, think about times in the past where you or a person 
you mentored won or retained an important client.” Participants in the Stakeholder Interest 
professional role identity condition were to consider: “As you look back on your career, think 
about times in the past where you or a person you mentored stood up to an aggressive client 
because it was the professionally responsible thing to do.” All participants were then asked to 
reflect on a particularly important example and to draft 2-3 short phrases that captured their 
thoughts. It was noted in the participants’ materials that their response could include, for 
example, how the event was meaningful to their professional career.
12
 
 Then, participants were provided hypothetical audit client background information, 
which included the client importance manipulation. Participants were asked to assume they are 
the person responsible for signing the audit opinion for the client. Those in the Higher client 
importance condition were informed that the accounting firm is the preferred assurance provider 
for the audit client’s PE firm owner. That is, the accounting firm provides assurance services to 
essentially all other companies owned by the PE firm; thus, substantial current and future 
business prospects exist. Participants in the Lower client importance condition were informed 
that the accounting firm is not the preferred assurance provider for the PE firm owner of the 
audit client, in which case the accounting firm does not provide services to other companies 
owned by the PE firm. In this condition, the materials also noted that the preferred assurance 
provider is heavily entrenched so it is unlikely that the audit firm will have any foreseeable 
growth opportunities with the client’s PE owner. In all conditions, participants were informed 
                                                 
12
 Refer to Appendix B for example participant responses to the professional role identity manipulation.  
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that the client’s PE firm owner and the accounting firm maintain a somewhat favorable, but 
fragile relationship and that any misstep in the current year’s audit could jeopardize the 
accounting firm’s relationship with the client’s PE owner. 
 I use the PE industry setting to operationalize levels of client importance primarily 
because I can examine the influence of perceived incentives related to individual audit 
executives in a setting where the influence of potential benefits from current and future client 
fees and costs due to visibility can be amplified while muting the influence of sanctioning risk 
from the PCAOB. The PE setting provides a critical opportunity for commercial incentives to 
permeate audit executive judgments and decisions. 
 Following the client importance manipulation, participants were presented with an 
accounting issue related to a legal contingency. The issue relates to the accounting recognition 
(e.g., whether to record an accrual and amount) and the level of disclosure in the notes to the 
financial statements (collectively, financial reporting) stemming from a client’s litigation loss 
contingency. The hypothetical case was designed for participants to use professional judgment 
and identify a course of action related to the client’s financial reporting. Included in the materials 
were various facts that supported or did not support a more conservative financial reporting 
course of action. The case materials were clear that a loss contingency was probable, yet there 
was some uncertainty as to whether the amount of potential loss could be reasonably estimated. 
It was noted that, although the client claimed they could not reasonably estimate either a point 
estimate or range of potential loss, the engagement team could develop estimates of both. 
Importantly, participants were informed that client management expressed a strong preference to 
not recognize any accrual for potential loss and to include as few details in the financial 
statement disclosure as possible while still meeting applicable reporting requirements. Three 
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retired Big 4 audit partners reviewed the case materials to ensure that the accounting issue and 
client scenario were realistic and that the facts of the accounting issue could support both more 
or less conservative financial reporting. Participants were then given a summary of ASC 450 – 
Contingencies and asked to apply the guidance by selecting a course of action in response to the 
client’s accounting issue.  
 For the primary dependent variables, I used three seven-point Likert scales to examine 
audit executive decisions about client accounting recognition and financial statement disclosure. 
Participants provided assessments about the likelihood of requesting management to record an 
accrual, the relative amount of the accrual, and the likelihood of requesting management to 
disclose relevant details about the nature of the contingency well beyond those minimally 
required for compliance purposes. Participants also were asked, in a free response question, to 
indicate the primary factors that influenced their overall decision. Next, audit executives were 
given six seven-point Likert scales representing financial reporting choices listed from most 
conservative (e.g., accrue the point estimate and disclose relevant details beyond the minimal 
compliance requirements) to least conservative (e.g., do not accrue any amount as a liability and 
disclose only those essential details, strictly speaking, for compliance purposes). Participants 
were asked to assess the likelihood that each financial reporting choice is acceptable for client 
management use in their financial statements. 
 Participants then responded to a series of survey questions to measure the salience of 
their relative commercial or stakeholder interest professional role identity, their beliefs about 
professional skepticism, and their perceptions of client importance. Demographic and 
comprehension check questions also were included. 
20 
 
 
 Finally, I administered a within-subjects manipulation of client importance. In particular, 
depending on the experimental condition, participants were asked how their response on the 
primary dependent measures would change assuming that their audit firm’s relationship with the 
PE owner had been described conversely, as the preferred assurance provider (not the preferred 
assurance provider) as opposed to not the preferred assurance provider (the preferred assurance 
provider). Professional role identity salience, however, was held constant. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Preliminary Tests 
 To ensure attendance to the experimental manipulations, I ask participants in a post-
experimental questionnaire, prior to the within-subjects manipulation, to indicate whether the 
central topic of the thought exercise was about “standing up to an aggressive client because it 
was the professionally responsible thing to do” or “winning or retaining an important client.” In 
this study, 86 percent of participants correctly answered this question. Further, 91 percent of 
participants correctly answered a question about whether or not the accounting firm was 
considered the preferred provider of assurance services for the client’s PE firm owner, 
suggesting that participants attended to both manipulations.
13
 
 To test the effectiveness of the professional role identity manipulation and to provide 
evidence in support of formed identities of audit executives, I use a measure developed in the 
spirit of an Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale, a measure of connectedness and identity 
previously used in accounting research (Bauer 2015) and psychology studies (Aron, Aron, and 
Smollan 1992; Tropp and Wright 2001). After collecting the primary dependent measures, I 
provide participants with seven pie-chart images shaded at varying degrees (1/8 increments). I 
ask participants to identify the picture that best describes how their personal attributes, beliefs, 
and qualities as an accounting professional align with, collectively (A): the maintenance of good 
client relationships, profitability, and growth of the profession (shaded portion) relative to, 
collectively (B): skepticism, protection of others' interests, and independence (unshaded portion). 
The 7/8 shaded image (indicative of a highly commercial professional role identity) is assigned a 
value of 7; the 1/8 shaded image (indicative of a highly stakeholder interest professional role 
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 Inferences are unchanged if data from the participants who failed either manipulation check are excluded from the 
analyses. 
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identity) is assigned a value of 1. Participants select relatively more shaded images when a 
commercial professional role identity is primed (mean = 5.04) relative to when a stakeholder 
interest identity is primed (mean = 4.59; F1,47 = 2.44, p = 0.063, one-tailed), thus indicating a 
moderately successful role identity manipulation.
14
 
 I elicit measures of client importance and capture participant perceptions on various 
dimensions, including how audit executives view the client’s importance to them individually 
and to their accounting firm. I use questions rated on seven-point scales from “not at all 
important” (1) to “extremely important” (7) and centered on “moderately important” (4). I ask 
participants to indicate how economically important both the PE portfolio client and the PE firm 
owner are to them. Participants indicate that the PE portfolio client is more personally 
economically important when client importance is higher (mean = 4.01) relative to lower (mean 
= 3.06; F1,49 = 4.99, p = 0.015, one-tailed), and that the PE firm owner is more personally 
economically important when client importance is higher (mean = 4.75) relative to lower (mean 
= 2.68; F1,49 = 20.29, p < 0.001, one-tailed).
15
  
 I also ask participants to indicate how important the PE portfolio client and the PE firm 
owner are to the audit partners’ firms. According to participant responses, the PE portfolio client 
is more economically important to their firm when client importance is higher (mean = 3.79) 
relative to lower (mean = 2.73; F1,49 = 5.92, p = 0.010, one-tailed). Similarly, participants 
indicate that the PE firm owner is more economically important to their firm when client 
importance is higher (mean = 5.14) relative to lower (mean = 2.83; F1,49 = 31.99, p < 0.001, one-
tailed).
16
 I further inquire about the importance level for participants to maintain a successful 
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 Two participants did not provide a response to this question. I find no other significant main or interaction effects 
(both p > 0.272). 
15
 I find no other significant main or interaction effects on either measure (all p > 0.436). 
16
 I find no other significant main or interaction effects on either measure (all p > 0.395). 
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relationship with the PE portfolio client. To participants, it is more important to maintain a 
successful relationship with the PE portfolio client when client importance is higher (mean = 
4.63) relative to lower (mean = 4.06; F1,49 = 2.21, p = 0.072, one-tailed).
17
 Next, I ask about the 
importance level for participants to maintain a successful relationship with the PE firm owner. 
Participant answers indicate it is more important to maintain a successful relationship with PE 
firm owner when client importance is higher (mean = 5.13) relative to lower (mean = 4.18; F1,49 
= 5.56, p = 0.011, one-tailed).
18
 
 Overall, these findings suggest a successful manipulation of client importance and 
professional role identity. However, more importantly, these findings convey knowledge about 
the presence of professional role identities within audit executives and how audit executives 
perceive client importance under various dimensions.
19
 
Test of Hypothesis about Audit Partners’ Client Accounting Conservatism 
 H1 predicts that audit partners who have a more salient commercial role identity when 
client importance is lower will allow less conservative client accounting than audit partners who 
have a more salient stakeholder interest professional identity (regardless of client importance) or 
audit partners who have a more salient commercial role identity when client importance is 
higher. Participants were asked “How likely are you to request management to record an 
accrual?” on a seven-point scale from “very unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3), and centered on 
“undecided” (0). Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for client accounting 
conservatism, where higher mean values indicate more client-preferred accounting conservatism. 
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 I find no other significant main or interaction effects (both p > 0.560). 
18
 I find a marginally significant main effect of professional role identity (p = 0.08), but no interaction effect (p = 
0.484). 
19
 Post-experimental questionnaire responses of various measures related to risk and professional skepticism suggest 
that, although participants hold a high level of professional skepticism, there were no differences between groups. 
Refer to supplemental analyses for discussion of these measures. 
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Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates graphically the observed means. Because H1 predicts an ordinal 
interaction (i.e., a nonsymmetric pattern of cell means), using contrast codes is the most 
appropriate way to test my hypothesis. This approach improves statistical power over the 
interaction tested in a traditional categorical ANOVA without increasing Type I error rates 
(Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990). Accordingly, I use contrast weights of -3 for the commercial 
professional role identity, lower client importance condition; +1 for the stakeholder interest 
professional role identity, lower client importance condition; +1 for the commercial professional 
role identity, higher client importance condition; and +1 for the stakeholder interest professional 
role identity, higher client importance condition. Table 1, Panel B displays a traditional 
categorical ANOVA, while Panel C presents my hypothesis test (using contrast weights) and 
simple main effects. 
 Results presented in Panel C show that the -3, +1, +1, +1 planned contrast is significant 
(F = 4.11, p = 0.024, one-tailed), consistent with my interaction prediction.
20
 A test of the 
residual between-cells variation (not tabulated) is not significant, suggesting that the 
hypothesized contrast explains variation in the data well (F2,49 = 1.95, p = 0.153, two-tailed).
21
 In 
addition, the follow-up simple effect tests suggest that for lower client importance, a salient 
commercial professional role identity (mean = 1.00) permits less conservative accounting 
relative to a salient stakeholder interest professional role identity (mean = 2.13; F = 3.97, p = 
0.026, one-tailed). The findings also demonstrate that, for a salient commercial professional role 
identity, higher client importance (mean = 2.09) results in more conservative accounting relative 
                                                 
20
 Although Shapiro-Wilk’s tests indicate that the data in three of the four conditions violate the assumption of 
normality, non-parametric tests for H1 lead to similar inferences. 
21
 The semi-omnibus F statistic tests the significance of the variation caused by the independent variables that is not 
explained by the hypothesized contrast; a p-value greater than 0.05 indicates that the remaining variation is 
insignificant (Keppel and Wickens 2004; Guggenmos, Piercey, and Agoglia 2016). I compute the semi-omnibus F 
test using the sums of squares from the ANOVA model testing the primary dependent variable. 
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to lower client importance (mean = 1.00; F = 3.79, p = 0.029, one-tailed). For completeness, the 
results imply that for a salient stakeholder interest professional role identity, accounting 
conservatism is not statistically significant between higher client importance (mean = 1.61) and 
lower client importance (mean = 2.13; F = 0.89, p = 0.349, two-tailed). In summary, this pattern 
of results is consistent with H1. 
 I also examine whether audit executives permit less financial statement disclosure 
transparency when a commercial versus stakeholder interest professional role identity is more 
salient, but only when serving clients of relatively lower importance. Participants were asked, 
“How likely are you to request management to disclose relevant details about the nature of the 
contingency that go well above and beyond the bare essentials required for compliance 
purposes?” on a seven-point scale from “very unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on 
“undecided” (0). Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and results of the analysis for 
expanded financial statement disclosure transparency. None of the specified tests is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Analyses reveal that audit executives view the decision to 
request accrual recognition differently than the decision to request financial statement disclosure 
above and beyond compliance requirements.
22
 
Tests of Research Questions about Accounting Recognition and Disclosure Transparency 
 As previously mentioned, I ask participants on two seven-point scales (centered on zero) 
the likelihood they would request client management to record an accrual and the likelihood they 
would request client management to disclose more details about the matter than required for 
compliance purposes. To examine whether audit partners tend to substitute accounting 
recognition and financial statement disclosure transparency, I first partition participants into four 
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 Untabulated analysis of the dependent variable measuring the amount of accrual recognition the audit partner will 
request management to record reveals that none of the specified tests is statistically significant at conventional 
levels. 
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categories based on their positive/negative responses to these two dependent measures: likely 
accrue/likely expand disclosure, likely accrue/unlikely expand disclosure, unlikely accrue/likely 
expand disclosure, and unlikely accrue/unlikely expand disclosure.  
 Table 3 reports the distribution of financial reporting preference by number of 
participants. Splitting the likelihood scales at zero, I find that 22 of 50 participants either selected 
likely accrue/unlikely expand disclosure or unlikely accrue/likely expand disclosure.
23
 This 
finding implies that although the majority of participants (28 or 56%) take a likely accrue/likely 
expand disclosure course of action, some participants (22 or 44%) tradeoff between the two 
decision choices, suggesting a substitution effect could exist. Interestingly, no participants chose 
to side with management by selecting unlikely accrue/unlikely expand disclosure. I also examine 
the correlation between accounting recognition and expanded financial statement disclosure, 
noting that the correlation between the two is not significant (r = -0.17; p = 0.221, two-tailed).  
 To further examine the potential substitution effect of accounting recognition and 
financial statement disclosure transparency, I examine two primary research questions: One, do 
audit partners request more transparent financial statement disclosure, yet allow less conservative 
accounting recognition (RQ1A), and does the tradeoff depend on client importance level 
(RQ1B)? Two, do audit partners request more conservative accounting recognition, yet allow 
less transparent financial statement disclosure (RQ2A), and does the tradeoff depend on client 
importance level (RQ2B)? 
 If audit partners request more transparent financial statement disclosure, yet allow less 
conservative accounting recognition, I would expect the cell mean pattern of financial statement 
disclosure to be greater than the pattern for accounting recognition overall (RQ1A) or depending 
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 Three participants were excluded: one participant indicated undecided accrue/unlikely expand disclosure, one 
participant indicated undecided accrue/likely expand disclosure, and one participant indicated undecided 
accrue/undecided expand disclosure. 
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on client importance level (RQ1B). The pattern of cell means in Tables 1 and 2 do not support 
RQ1A or RQ1B. That is, the individual cell means of accounting recognition are all greater than 
their paired cell means of expanded financial statement disclosure. Overall, compelling evidence 
does not exist to suggest that audit partners substitute more conservative accounting recognition 
with more forthcoming financial statement disclosure (RQ1A), regardless of the influence of 
client importance (RQ1B). 
 The pattern of cell means, however, could support RQ2A and RQ2B. To examine RQ2A 
and RQ2B, I perform a paired t-test, comparing paired audit partner decisions of accounting 
recognition (Table 1) and expanded financial statement disclosure (Table 2). Results for RQ2A 
indicate that, overall, accrual recognition (mean = 1.73) is higher than expanded financial 
statement disclosure (mean = 0.76; t52 = 0.76, p = 0.012, two-tailed), suggesting that audit 
partners are overall more likely to request client management to recognize an accrual than to 
request financial statement disclosure beyond compliance requirements. 
 Further, results for RQ2B show no difference in the likelihood of requesting accrual 
recognition (mean = 1.59) and expanded financial statement disclosure (mean = 1.15) when 
serving clients of lower importance (t24 = 0.76, p = 0.452, two-tailed). However, when serving 
clients of higher importance, accrual recognition (mean = 1.85) is higher when compared to 
financial statement disclosure (mean = 0.41; t27 = 3.08, p = 0.005, two-tailed). These results 
propose that audit partners appear to request more conservative accounting recognition, yet allow 
more flexibility in the amount of details disclosed in the financial statements, primarily when 
serving clients of higher importance.  
 In summary, although compelling evidence does not exist to suggest that audit executives 
permit less conservative accounting recognition for expanded financial statement disclosure, I 
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find evidence to suggest that audit executives treat the paired decision of accounting recognition 
and expanded financial disclosure differently, particularly on different levels of client 
importance. 
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V. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
Evidence of Underlying Theory 
 To illuminate audit executives’ perceptions of the stakes or consequences of coming to an 
incorrect conclusion (e.g., extent of audit partners’ commitments to accuracy goals), I ask 
participants in a post-experimental questionnaire to identify how costly it would be to their 
career if they did not request the client to modify their preferred accounting treatment and a 
misstatement was later revealed. I use a seven-point scale from “not at all costly” (1) to “very 
costly” (7) and centered on “moderately costly” (4). Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics 
and ANOVA. I find that participants perceive a misstatement to be more costly to their careers in 
the higher client importance condition (mean = 6.16) compared to the lower client importance 
condition (mean = 5.28; F = 6.98, p = 0.006, one-tailed).
24
 I also ask participants to identify how 
costly it would be to their careers if they requested the client to do something management 
deemed undesirable and the firm lost the client over the disagreement (e.g., extent of audit 
partners’ commitments to directional goals of appeasing management). I use a seven-point scale 
from “not at all costly” (1) to “very costly” (7) and centered on “moderately costly” (4). Analysis 
in Table 7 reveals that participants do not perceive the loss of the client as more costly to their 
career in the higher client importance condition (mean = 2.24) compared to the lower client 
importance condition (mean = 1.87; F = 1.82, p = 0.183, two-tailed). Thus, although audit 
partners appear to hold similar commitments to directional goals in both the lower and higher 
importance conditions, audit partners’ commitments to accuracy goals appear stronger for clients 
of relatively higher client importance. Importantly, these findings are consistent with motivated 
reasoning theory. 
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 One participant did not provide a response to this question. 
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 According to psychology theory, when task importance is greater (i.e., the salience of 
consequences is heightened), individuals will likely expend more cognitive effort as a result of 
increased accuracy motivations. Thus, I also measure the amount of cognitive effort (i.e., time in 
seconds) participants expended between reading the client importance manipulation and 
responding to the primary dependent questions.
25
 This includes time spent reading the 
background, accounting issue, and applicable guidance, and answering the primary dependent 
questions. Results show that audit executives expended marginally more cognitive effort (i.e., 
time in seconds) in the higher client importance condition (mean = 598) compared to the lower 
client importance condition (mean = 488; F1,48 = 1.91, p = 0.087, one-tailed).
26
 Importantly, more 
effortful cognitive processing accompanied by accuracy goals has been shown in prior 
psychology research to attenuate the effects of some information processing biases. Therefore, 
this finding suggests that the effects of professional role identity that were observed under lower 
client importance are attenuated under higher client importance due to deeper and more effortful 
cognitive effort stemming from motivations for accurate decision-making. 
 Collectively, these results provide support for motivated reasoning theory. Not only do 
audit executives perceive the stakes or consequences to be greater when serving clients of higher 
importance, but they also engage in more careful and effortful cognitive processing. That is, 
when serving clients of lower importance, professional role identity appears to influence audit 
partner decision-making, yet as client importance increases, the identity effects are attenuated. 
Insights into the Conscious versus Subconscious Nature of the Decision Process 
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 While the conceptual definition of cognitive effort includes intensity and duration of attention (Libby and Lipe 
1992), I focus on time spent on issue deliberation as it can be reliably measured. 
26
 One participant was excluded from the analysis for spending time deliberating on the accounting issue that was 
more than eight times greater than the average of all other participants’ and more than ten standard deviations 
greater than the mean. I find no other significant main or interaction effects (both p > 0.825). 
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 As Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson (2002) suggest, a better understanding is warranted of 
how (i.e., the process through which) incentive effects occur. Bazerman, Morgan, and 
Loewenstein (1997) suggest that auditors cannot be independent because of the subconscious 
judgment effects arising from such incentives. Other researchers have argued that through a 
conscious decision-making process, counterbalancing forces, such as legal sanctioning or market 
penalties from reputational loss, reduce auditors’ incentives to misreport (Keune and Johnstone 
2012). Thus, auditors face conscious tradeoffs between client fees for allowing more aggressive 
accounting versus potential economic penalties for permitting more aggressive accounting (King 
2002). If audit partners’ variation in acceptable client accounting is a result of conscious decision 
processes, audit executives should modify their decisions about acceptable client accounting 
when the description about the importance of the client is overtly reversed (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1996).  
 In my study, I ask participants whether their client accounting decision would change, if 
at all, given the opposite client importance scenario. At the end of the instrument, participants are 
told to reconsider their initial client accounting preference (e.g., likelihood of requesting client 
management to record an accrual) when their audit firm’s relationship with the PE owner was 
instead described as the opposite type (the audit firm was the preferred assurance provider for the 
PE firm owner, or was not the preferred assurance provider for the PE firm owner). Participants 
responded by choosing one of three choices: 1) “I would be more likely to request 
management…” 2) no change in action; or 3) “I would be less likely to request management…” 
Results indicate that 96% (24 of 25 participants) did not revise their initial decision from lower 
client importance to higher client importance and that 96% (27 of 28 participants) did not revise 
their initial decision from higher client importance to lower client importance. Therefore, I find 
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an interactive effect of professional role identity and client importance on a between-subjects 
basis; yet, on a within-subjects basis the same participants indicate, on average, they would not 
alter their initial decision under the opposite level of client importance. This finding suggests that 
audit partners seemingly believe their judgments are unaffected by perceptions of client 
importance. 
Audit Partner to Audit Senior Decision Comparison 
 In a separate experiment, I administer a nearly identical experimental instrument to 
lower-level ranked audit seniors (i.e., 3-5 year professionals) to better empirically investigate 
whether the effects of professional role identities and client importance are conditional on 
auditor rank. Overall, I expect audit partners and audit seniors to make divergent judgments, 
given the differing roles they routinely engage in within the firm and how they perceive client 
importance. 
Professional Role Identity 
 Auditors engage in diverse roles within their organization depending on their rank and 
tenure. Although audit partners and audit seniors routinely engage in a stakeholder interest role 
of dispatching quality audits in accordance with professional standards, audit partners are likely 
to have more developed commercial identities, given a partner’s routine role of engaging in sales 
activities. For example, audit seniors’ roles include managing audit engagements on a day-to-day 
operational level, interacting with clients, performing audit tasks, and delegating to and 
reviewing work from lower-ranking staff. Audit seniors may also participate in client pursuit 
teams in an attempt to attract and attain new clients. In contrast, audit partners not only are the 
decision-finalizing members of audit teams, who oversee the entire audit product, but also they 
are incentivized to attract or retain clients. Thus, audit partners routinely engage in a role of 
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selling professional services. Since role identities are formed through engaging in actions or 
behaviors, I do not expect lower-ranking audit seniors, who do not routinely engage in a 
commercial role of selling services, to have developed a strong commercial identity. However, I 
do expect audit seniors to have developed a relatively strong stakeholder interest identity due to 
their routine role of dispatching audits in accordance with professional standards. In summary, I 
expect audit partners and audit seniors to have differing levels of identity development. 
Client Importance 
 Audit seniors and audit partners likely perceive client importance differently given their 
different roles and incentives as auditors. Whereas audit partners likely perceive the personal and 
career benefits or consequences of retaining or losing clients of higher importance quite saliently, 
audit seniors likely do not have the experience or the underlying incentives to fully comprehend 
similar risks and rewards to attaining or retaining important clients. Although I do not expect 
audit seniors and audit partners to perceive client importance similarly, I do expect audit seniors 
to have the ability to identify attributes of higher and lower important clients. 
Participants and Design 
 One hundred forty-three audit seniors from a Big Four accounting firm in the U.S. 
participated in the experiment.
27
 Audit senior participants have, on average, four years of 
experience.
28
 Identical to the partner study, I employ a 2 x 2 between-subjects design where I 
manipulate professional role identity salience and client importance. In the senior study, I add a 
control condition to examine the effects of client importance without the influence of 
professional role identity.  
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 In contrast to the audit partner study that was administered online through the Qualtrics platform, the audit senior 
study was administered on paper at a national firm training event by the author and four research assistants. 
28
 Three managers with nine and 10 years of experience were included within the sample.  Inferences from primary 
dependent variables and process measures do not change when excluded. 
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 Although the details of the case in the audit senior experiment are identical to those in the 
audit partner experiment, certain modifications are made for the case to be applicable to lower-
ranked senior auditors. The following modifications are within the experimental instrument. One, 
because lower-level auditors are not likely to attain clients in a similar fashion as audit partners, 
the wording of the commercial identity manipulation is modified to state: “Think about times in 
the past when you participated on a client pursuit team (i.e., a team bidding on a client), or what 
it would be like to participate on a client pursuit team, that won or retained an important client.” 
Furthermore, instead of asking audit seniors to decide on a course of action, as partners typically 
do in the decision finalization role, audit senior participants are asked to recommend a course of 
action to the audit partner. 
 The dependent variables in the audit partner experiment and audit senior experiment are 
equivalent. Related to accounting conservatism, participants are asked, “How likely are you to 
recommend that management record an accrual?” on a seven-point scale from “very unlikely” (-
3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). Related to financial statement 
transparency, participants are asked, “How likely are you to recommend management disclose 
relevant details about the nature of the contingency that go well above and beyond the bare 
essentials required for compliance purposes?” on a seven-point scale from “very unlikely” (-3) to 
“very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). 
Preliminary Tests 
 To ensure audit senior participants attend to the experimental manipulations, I ask 
participants in a post-experimental questionnaire, prior to the within-subjects manipulation, to 
indicate whether the central topic of the thought exercise is about “standing up to an aggressive 
client because it was the professionally responsible thing to do” or “participating on a team that 
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won or retained an important client.” Seventy-eight percent of participants correctly answered 
this question. Eighty-four percent of participants correctly answered a similar question about 
whether or not the accounting firm was considered the preferred provider of assurance services 
for the client’s PE firm owner. 
 Similar to the audit partner study, I ask audit seniors to assess their own identity in terms 
of commercial attributes or stakeholder interest attributes. In contrast to audit partners, audit 
seniors do not select relatively more commercial related images when a commercial professional 
role identity is primed (mean = 3.55) relative to when a stakeholder interest identity is primed 
(mean = 3.55; F1,94 = 0.45, p = 0.506, two-tailed). These results suggest that audit seniors are not 
as sensitive as audit partners to identity activation in terms of how they identify with commercial 
aspects or stakeholder interest aspects. This finding is expected, given audit seniors’ differing 
role within the accounting firm that focuses primarily on dispatching audits in accordance with 
professional standards rather than also engaging in a commercial role of selling services. 
 Similar to the audit partner study, I elicit measures of client importance, capturing 
participants’ perceptions on various dimensions, including how audit seniors view the client’s 
importance to themselves individually and to their accounting firm. The following questions 
were asked and rated on seven-point scales from “not at all important” (1) to “extremely 
important” (7) and centered on “moderately important” (4). I ask participants to indicate how 
economically important both the PE portfolio client and the PE firm owner is to them 
individually. In contrast to audit partners, audit senior participants indicate that the PE portfolio 
client is not more economically important to them when client importance is higher (mean = 
3.89) relative to lower (mean = 3.74; F1,94 = 0.24, p = 0.629, two-tailed). However, consistent 
with audit partners, audit seniors indicate that the PE firm owner is more economically important 
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to them when client importance is higher (mean = 4.18) relative to lower (mean = 3.34; F1,94 = 
7.09, p = 0.005, one-tailed).
29
  
 I also ask participants to indicate how important the PE portfolio client and the PE firm 
owner are to the audit seniors’ firms. In contrast to audit partners, audit senior participants 
indicate that the PE portfolio client is not more economically important to their firm when client 
importance is higher (mean = 4.59) relative to lower (mean = 4.44; F1,89 = 0.30, p = 0.584, two-
tailed). Nonetheless, audit senior participants, similar to audit partners, indicate that the PE firm 
owner is more economically important to their firm when client importance is higher (mean = 
5.33) relative to lower (mean = 4.15; F1,94 = 17.05, p < 0.001, one-tailed).
30
 I further ask how 
important it was for participants to maintain a successful relationship with the PE portfolio 
client. In contrast to audit partner participants, audit senior participant responses indicate it is not 
more important to maintain a successful relationship with the PE portfolio client when client 
importance is higher (mean = 4.65) relative to lower (mean = 4.65; F1,94 < 0.01, p = 0.965, two-
tailed). Next, I ask how important it is for participants to maintain a successful relationship with 
the PE firm owner. Consistent with audit partners, audit senior participant responses indicate it is 
more important to maintain a successful relationship with PE firm owner when client importance 
is higher (mean = 4.95) relative to lower (mean = 3.94; F1,91 = 12.08, p < 0.001, one-tailed).
31
 
 In summary, audit seniors and audit partners appear to not perceive client importance in 
identical ways, yet overall, these findings suggest a successful manipulation of client importance. 
As expected, my primary measure of identity activation suggests that, compared to audit 
partners, audit seniors do not appear to be influenced similarly by the environmental cues within 
the professional role identity manipulation. 
                                                 
29
 I find no significant main or interaction effects (both p > 0.603). 
30
 I find no significant main or interaction effects (both p > 0.651). 
31
 I find no significant main or interaction effects (both p > 0.177). 
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Audit Seniors’ Client Accounting Conservatism and Financial Statement Disclosure 
Transparency 
 Panel A of Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for client accounting conservatism, 
where higher mean values indicate more client accounting conservatism. Panel B displays a 
traditional categorical ANOVA, while Panel C presents a planned contrast as well as simple 
main effects. In contrast to audit partners, none of the specified tests related to audit seniors’ 
client accounting conservatism is statistically significant at conventional levels. In Table 6, there 
is a marginal three-way interaction between Auditor Rank, Professional Role Identity, and Client 
Importance (F = 2.89, p = 0.092, two-tailed), suggesting that audit partners and seniors reach 
different decisions given professional role identity and client importance. Again, this finding is 
expected, given audit seniors’ differing role within the accounting firm. 
 Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics, ANOVA, planned contrast, and simple main 
effects related to expanded financial statement disclosure transparency. In contrast to audit 
partners, results presented in Panel C show that a -3, +1, +1, +1 planned contrast related to audit 
seniors is only marginally significant (F = 2.25, p = 0.068, one-tailed). In addition, the follow-up 
simple effect tests imply that for lower client importance, a salient commercial professional role 
identity (mean = 0.44) allows for less conservative disclosure transparency relative to a salient 
stakeholder interest professional role identity (mean = 1.53; F = 4.56, p = 0.018, one-tailed). 
None of the remaining simple main effect tests is significant at conventional levels. In Table 6, 
an expanded ANOVA reveals no three-way interaction between Auditor Rank, Professional Role 
Identity, and Client Importance (F = 0.06, p = 0.812, two-tailed). 
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 Taking these findings as a whole, professional role identity and client importance appear 
to influence audit seniors and audit partners differently, as expected, regarding judgments of 
accounting conservatism and financial statement disclosure transparency. 
 Further analyses reveal that in contrast to audit partners, audit seniors do not perceive the 
consequences of making an incorrect decision (e.g., commitments to accuracy goals) to be 
greater in the higher client importance condition compared to the lower client importance 
condition. For example, as presented in Table 7, audit seniors in the higher client importance 
condition (mean = 5.47) do not perceive a misstatement to be more costly to their careers 
compared to the lower client importance condition (mean = 5.29; F = 0.42, p = 0.516, two-
tailed). This result suggests that audit seniors’ commitments to accuracy goals do not change 
when client importance increases. Similar to the audit partner experiment, I ask audit senior 
participants to identify how costly it would be to their careers if they requested the client to do 
something management deemed undesirable and the firm lost the client over the disagreement. 
Similar to audit partner participants, as noted in Table 7, audit senior participants do not perceive 
the loss of the client to be more costly to their careers in the higher client importance condition 
(mean = 5.25) compared to the lower client importance condition (mean = 3.46; F = 0.34, p = 
0.563, two-tailed), suggesting that audit seniors’ commitments to directional goals do not change 
when client importance increases.  
 Interestingly, in an audit partner to audit senior comparison, I find that descriptive means 
of audit partners’ and audit seniors’ perceptions about the costliness of a later revealed 
misstatement on their careers to be close to one another, and not statistically significantly 
different overall (partner mean = 5.75; senior mean = 5.38; F = 1.89; p = 0.171, two-tailed) and 
in the lower client importance condition (partner mean = 5.23; senior mean = 5.29; t69 = 0.03, p = 
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0.975). However, audit partners perceive (mean = 6.19) a misstatement to be more costly to their 
careers than audit seniors (mean = 5.47; t75 = 2.17, p = 0.033, two-tailed) in the higher client 
importance condition, suggesting that audit partners have greater accuracy-related goal 
commitment when client importance is higher. Further, I find that audit seniors perceive 
requesting the client to do something management deemed undesirable resulting in the firm 
losing the client over the disagreement to be more costly to their careers than audit partners 
overall (senior mean = 3.35; partner mean = 2.06; F = 30.28, p < 0.001) and in conditions of 
lower client importance (senior mean = 3.46; partner mean = 1.87; t69 = 4.51, p = <0.001) and 
higher client importance (senior mean = 3.25; partner mean = 2.26; t75 = 3.12, p = 0.003). 
Therefore, my study indicates that audit seniors generally have greater directional goal 
commitments than audit partners, and, overall, that audit partners and audit seniors appear to 
have differing accuracy and directional goal commitments. 
Audit Senior versus Audit Partner Comparisons of Professional Skepticism and 
Perceptions of Client Pressure 
 I also compare perceptions of client pressure (Koch and Salterio 2015) and three different 
dimensions within an attitude conceptualization of professional skepticism, which include 
measures of beliefs, feelings, and actions (Nolder and Kadous 2014), between audit partners and 
audit seniors. The following results suggest that audit partners and audit seniors hold different 
perceptions of professional skepticism and client pressure. 
Professional Skepticism - Beliefs 
 Table 8 presents descriptive statistics and analyses related to beliefs of professional 
skepticism. I ask participants to rate three measures. The first measure asks, “How would you 
assess the risk that Basepoint's financial statements are materially misstated when using 
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management's preferred accounting treatment?” on a seven-point scale from “low” (1) to “high” 
(7) and centered on “moderate” (4). Analysis reveals that, overall, audit partners’ descriptive 
mean (mean = 5.15) and audit seniors’ descriptive mean (mean = 4.95; F = 0.62, p = 0.433, two-
tailed) are not statistically significantly different from one another. The second measure asks, 
“How reasonable is management's preferred accounting treatment?” on a seven-point scale from 
“very unreasonable” (-3) to “very reasonable” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). Overall, 
audit partners (mean = -1.25) believe that management’s preferred accounting treatment is 
marginally less reasonable than audit seniors (mean = -0.85; F = 2.87, p = 0.092, two-tailed). The 
third measure asks “Based on the brief information provided in the case, how would you rate 
management's competence?” on a seven-point scale from “very low” (1) to “very high” (+3) and 
centered on “moderate” (0). Although a three-way interaction is observed (F = 5.59; p = 0.019, 
two-tailed), overall, audit partners’ descriptive mean (mean = 3.64) and audit seniors’ descriptive 
mean (mean = 3.72; F = 0.18, p = 0.673, two-tailed) are not statistically significantly different. In 
summary, audit partners and audit seniors have different perceptions about their beliefs of 
professional skepticism related to the reasonableness of management’s preferred accounting 
treatment. 
Professional Skepticism - Feelings 
 Table 9 presents descriptive statistics and analyses related to feelings of professional 
skepticism. I ask participants to rate two measures. The first measure asks, “How worried are 
you that the financial statements are misstated if Basepoint uses their preferred accounting 
treatment (i.e., to not record an accrual and to disclose a minimally acceptable level of detail 
about the nature of the contingency in the notes to the financial statements)?” on a seven-point 
scale from “not at all worried” (1) to “very worried” (7) and centered on “moderately worried” 
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(4). Overall, audit partners’ descriptive mean (mean = 5.21) and audit seniors’ descriptive mean 
(mean = 5.13; F = 0.08, p = 0.783, two-tailed) are not statistically significantly different overall. 
Next, I ask participants, “How worried are you that the evidence supporting management’s 
preferred accounting treatment is not sufficient to support their conclusion?” on a seven-point 
scale from “not at all worried” (1) to “very worried” (7) and centered on “moderately worried” 
(4). Analysis reveals a non-significant three-way interaction (F = 2.45; p = 0.120, two-tailed), 
and overall, audit partners’ descriptive mean (mean = 5.26) and audit seniors’ descriptive mean 
(mean = 5.06; F = 0.68, p = 0.412, two-tailed) are close to each other and not statistically 
significantly different. 
Professional Skepticism - Actions 
 Table 10 presents descriptive statistics and analyses related to actions of professional 
skepticism. I ask participants to rate three measures. The first measure asks, “How likely are you 
to take the following action: seek additional evidence and/or explanation from Basepoint's 
management?” on a seven-point scale from “very unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and 
centered on “undecided” (0). Analysis reveals that, overall, audit partners (mean = 2.80) are 
more likely to seek additional evidence and/or explanation from management compared to audit 
seniors (mean = 2.39; F = 10.79, p = 0.001, two-tailed). The second measure asks, “How likely 
are you to take the following action: consult (recommend consultation) with a technical partner 
or your firm’s professional practice group regarding the accounting issue?” on a seven-point 
scale from “very unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3), and centered on “undecided” (0). Analysis 
reveals that, overall, audit partners’ descriptive mean (mean = 2.29) and audit seniors’ 
descriptive mean (mean = 2.12; F = 0.93, p = 0.337, two-tailed) are not statistically significantly 
different. The third measure asks, “How likely are you to take the following action: Bring 
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(Recommend bringing) the accounting issue up with the audit committee?” on a seven-point 
scale from “very unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). Overall, 
audit partners (mean = 2.61) are more likely to bring (recommend bringing) the issue up with the 
audit committee than audit seniors (mean = 1.53; F = 30.21, p < 0.001, two-tailed). In summary, 
audit partners are more likely to seek out additional evidence and bring the issue up with the 
audit committee when compared to audit seniors. 
Perceptions of Client Pressure 
 Table 11 presents descriptive statistics and analyses related to perceptions of client 
pressure. I also elicited two measures of perceptions of client pressure (Koch and Salterio 2015). 
The first measure states, “If you do not agree with Basepoint's management, they are in a 
position to penalize you for your behavior” on a seven-point scale from “strongly disagree” (-3) 
to “strongly agree” (+3) and centered on “neither agree nor disagree” (0). Overall, audit partners 
(mean = 0.67) perceive that management is more in a position to penalize them for their behavior 
compared to audit seniors (mean = -0.27; F = 9.41, p = 0.003, two-tailed). The second measure 
asks, “Client management's interests and your interests as an auditor are in conflict in this 
situation” on a seven-point scale from “strongly disagree” (-3) to “strongly agree” (+3) and 
centered on “neither agree nor disagree” (0). Analysis reveals that, overall, audit partners’ 
descriptive mean (mean = 1.13) and audit seniors’ descriptive mean (mean = 1.31; F = 0.53, p = 
0.466, two-tailed) are not statistically significantly different. In summary, although perceptions 
of conflicts of interest are similar between audit partners and audit seniors, audit partners 
perceive that management is in a position to penalize them for their behavior more than audit 
seniors. Overall, these findings suggest that audit partners hold different perceptions of client 
pressure compared to audit seniors. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 In this study, I provide experimental evidence that the salience of two audit partner 
professional role identities (stakeholder interest versus commercial) and audit firm client 
importance (lower versus higher) interact to jointly influence judgments and decisions about 
client financial reporting. Specifically, I find that audit executives with a salient commercial 
versus stakeholder interest professional role identity allow more aggressive client accounting, but 
more so when client importance is lower versus higher. Audit partners with a salient stakeholder 
interest professional role identity request more conservative client accounting recognition 
regardless the level of client importance. I do not find evidence to suggest that auditors generally 
substitute more conservative accounting recognition for expanded financial statement disclosure, 
but it appears that audit partners treat the paired decision of accounting recognition and expanded 
financial statement disclosure differently depending on levels of client importance. Finally, my 
results suggest that the influence of professional role identity, particularly a commercial identity, 
manifests primarily at the audit partner level and not at lower-level audit senior ranks. 
 One limitation of this study is that my results regarding the subconscious nature of the 
decision process related to client importance could be subject to effects of self-preservation 
concerns or social desirability bias. That is, the audit partner responses to the client importance 
within-subjects manipulation could stem from not wanting to overtly concede that their decisions 
about client financial reporting depend on the level of client importance. Despite the anonymous 
and confidential nature of my research study and open candor of audit partners discussing in free 
response questions the influence that landing important clients had on their careers, a claim that 
client importance effects appear to stem from a subconscious decision process is limited by 
participants potentially engaging in self-preservation or exhibiting a social desirability bias. One 
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reason is because I ask audit executives directly about their own behavior within the 
experimental materials. The choice to directly ask about audit partners’ own behavior allows me 
to examine the influence of individual audit executive professional role identity that manifests 
through personal experiences as an accounting professional. I concluded that it is essential to 
examine professional role identity by directly asking about individual participant behavior. 
 Despite this potential limitation, my dissertation has important implications for 
researchers, audit practitioners, and regulators. One, by drawing on motivated reasoning theory, I 
show that identity effects are attenuated as the stakes or consequences of drawing an incorrect 
conclusion increase (e.g., higher client importance). Two, I provide evidence suggesting that 
audit partners reach different decisions depending on the joint interaction of professional role 
identities and client importance. Thus, auditors do not always think and make decisions under a 
single professional identity as primarily shown in prior research (King 2002; Bamber and Iyer 
2007; Suddaby et al. 2009; Bauer 2015). Interestingly, I find that simply asking partners to write 
down thoughts about winning an important client or standing up to an aggressive client can 
trigger different identities, suggesting that these identities can be easily activated in the natural 
environment resulting in pervasive effects. Three, counter to prior research, this study does not 
find compelling evidence to suggest that auditors generally trade off more conservative client 
accounting recognition for more forthcoming financial statement disclosure transparency as 
noted in prior research related to auditor fair-value decisions (Griffin 2014). Instead, I find that 
audit partners tend to request more conservative client accounting recognition, but permit less 
forthcoming financial statement disclosure transparency, particularly when serving clients of 
higher client importance. Four, this study provides a better understanding of the type of decision 
processes through which client incentive effects (related to client importance) occur. In 
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particular, I find that incentive effects related to client importance appear to be the result of a 
subconscious decision process. Finally, this study enhances our understanding of how the 
expanding, but understudied, PE organizational form and its operating environments influence 
audit partners (Financial Services Authority 2006; Cumming et al. 2007; Wright et al. 2009). 
 Although regulators have criticized private equity industry firms for engaging in 
aggressive accounting and financial reporting, private equity industry firms are not subject to 
public company regulatory scrutiny and auditors of these firms are not sanctioned under PCAOB 
regulations. Thus, future research could examine whether auditors make different decisions for 
private equity industry clients compared to publically traded clients (i.e., when stricter 
regulations are in place). 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 
Experimental Design 
 
Panel A: 2x2 Between-Subjects Design Portion 
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Figure 1 (cont.) 
Experimental Design 
 
Panel B: Administration of Tasks 
 
Participants begin by reading background information about the tasks within the experimental instrument.  
 
Professional Role Identity Between-Subjects Manipulation 
Participants are asked to complete a thought exercise by reflecting on their career. They are asked to think of a 
particularly important example and to write down thoughts that come to mind about this particular example. 
 
Commercial Identity Condition 
As you look back on your career, think about times 
in the past when you or a person you mentored won 
or retained an important client. 
Stakeholder Interest Identity Condition 
As you look back on your career, think about times in 
the past when you or a person you mentored stood up to 
an aggressive client because it was the professionally 
responsible thing to do. 
 
Client Importance Between-Subjects Manipulation 
Participants read background information about the audit client, management, the client’s audit committee, the 
client’s board of directors, and the relationship between the client and the audit firm. The background 
information includes the client importance manipulation. In all conditions, participants are told that the audit 
firm and the private equity owner maintain a somewhat favorable, but fragile relationship and that any misstep 
in the current year’s portfolio company audit could jeopardize the audit firm’s relationship with the private 
equity owner. 
Lower Client Importance Condition 
Participants are told that their firm is not considered 
the preferred provider of assurance services for the 
private equity owner, so their firm does not audit 
other portfolio companies owned by the private 
equity firm. Additionally, participants are told that 
the preferred assurance provider is heavily 
entrenched with the private equity firm, thus it is 
unlikely that their audit firm will have any 
foreseeable growth opportunities with the private 
equity owner. 
Higher Client Importance Condition 
Participants are told that their firm is considered the 
preferred provider of assurance services for the private 
equity owner, so their firm audits essentially all other 
portfolio companies owned by the private equity firm. 
 
Accounting Issue and Accounting Guidance 
Participants read about the accounting issue which relates to a litigation loss contingency. The materials were 
designed to provide participants with several facts that could support both more conservative and less 
conservative financial reporting. The materials indicate that client management has expressed a strong 
preference to not record any accrual for potential loss and to include as few details in the footnote disclosure as 
possible while still meeting applicable reporting requirements. Participants are provided with a summary of 
ASC 450 – Contingencies. 
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Figure 1 (cont.) 
Experimental Design 
 
Panel B (cont.): Administration of Tasks 
 
Between-Subjects Dependent Variables 
Participant responses are measured on seven-point scales 
1) How likely are you to request management to record an accrual? 
2) If you were to request management to record an accrual, what amount would you ask them to 
record? 
3) How likely are you to request management to disclose relevant details about the nature of the 
contingency that go well above and beyond the bare essentials required for compliance purposes? 
4) Indicate the primary factors that influenced your overall decision (free response). 
5) How acceptable are each of the six financial reporting choices? 
 
Post-experiment Questionnaire 
Participants complete the post-experiment questionnaire. 
 
Client Importance Within-Subjects Manipulation 
Participants are asked to think back to the beginning of the case materials and the accounting issue that 
surfaced.  Participants were reminded that their audit firm was or was not considered the preferred 
provider of assurance services for the private equity firm owner (depending on which condition they 
were randomly assigned).  The materials then ask participants to consider if they were instead told that 
their audit firm had the other relationship with the private equity firm.  
 
Participants that were initially assigned to the 
Higher Client Importance Condition read: 
Consider if you were instead told that your firm 
was not considered the preferred provider of 
assurances services for the private equity owner, 
so your firm does not audit other portfolio 
companies owned by the private equity firm. 
Additionally, the preferred assurance provider is 
heavily entrenched with the private equity firm, 
thus it is unlikely that your audit firm will have 
any foreseeable growth opportunities with the 
private equity owner. 
Participants that were initially assigned to the 
Lower Client Importance Condition read: 
Consider if you were instead told that your firm 
was considered the preferred provider of 
assurances services for the private equity owner, 
so your firm audits essentially all other portfolio 
companies owned by the private equity firm. 
 
Within-Subjects Dependent Variables 
Participant responses are measured on three categorical choice measures (more likely to request…; no 
change; less likely to request…) 
1) Based on this new scenario, how would your decision related to requesting management to record 
an accrual change, if any? 
2) Based on this new scenario, how would your decision related to the level of disclosure about the 
nature of the contingency change, if any? 
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Figure 2 
Hypothesized graphical pattern and observed graphical pattern 
 
Panel A: Hypothesized Ordinal Interaction of Professional Role Identity and Client Importance 
on Client Accounting Conservativism 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Observed Professional Role Identity and Client Importance on Client Accounting 
Conservatism 
 
 
 
 
Panel A depicts the pattern consistent with the hypothesized interaction of professional role identity (commercial or 
stakeholder interest) and client importance (lower or higher) on audit partners’ client accounting conservatism. Panel 
B depicts the observed pattern of cell means for audit partners’ decisions of client accounting conservatism. This 
pattern is tested using the ANOVA presented in Panel B of Table 1. A total of 53 audit partners provide judgments 
on a seven-point scale, from “very unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0), to capture 
accounting conservatism. The accounting conservatism measure asks “How likely are you to request management to 
record an accrual?” Higher cell means are indicative of more conservatism. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Audit Partner - Accounting Conservatism 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Accounting Conservatism 
 
   
Accrual Recognition 
   
Professional Role Identity 
 
   
Commercial 
Stakeholder 
Interest 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
C
li
en
t 
Im
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o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
Mean 1.00 2.13 1.59 
(Standard deviation) (2.12) (0.88) (1.66) 
Sample size 12 13 25 
Cell A B 
 
    
H
ig
h
er
     Mean 2.09 1.61 1.85 
(Standard deviation) (1.13) (1.34) (1.24) 
Sample size 14 14 28 
Cell C D 
 
    
 
A
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t 
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n
ce
 
   
 
 
Mean 1.58 1.86 1.73 
 
(Standard deviation) (1.72) (1.15) (1.45) 
 
Sample size 26 27 53 
 
   
  
Panel B: Basic ANOVA Model of Accounting Conservatism 
 
  Accrual Recognition 
Source df MS F p-value** 
Professional Role Identity 1 1.43 0.71 0.402 
Client Importance 1 1.07 0.53 0.469 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 8.47 4.21 0.046 
Error 49 2.01     
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Audit Partner - Accounting Conservatism 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Simple Main Effect Tests for H1 
  Accrual Recognition 
Source df F p-value 
Overall Test: 
   
  Audit partners will allow the least conservative client accounting 
  when a commercial professional role identity is salient and client 
  importance is lower when compared to all other conditions. 
  Contrast weights (-3, +1, +1, +1)* 
 
1,49 4.11 0.024 
Follow-up Simple Effect Tests: 
   
  Effect of professional role identity given lower client importance  
  [B - A]* 
1,49 3.97 0.026 
  Effect of client importance given commercial professional role 
  identity [C - A]* 
1,49 3.79 0.029 
  Effect of client importance given stakeholder interest professional 
  role identity [D - B]** 
1,49 0.89 0.349 
  Effect of professional role identity given higher client importance  
  [C - D]** 
1,49 0.77 0.383 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, ANOVA, contrast-coded ANOVA, and simple main effect tests for the 
primary measure used in my experiment to capture audit executives’ client accounting conservatism (e.g., accrual 
recognition). The experiment manipulates whether participants are subjected to a commercial or a stakeholder 
interest professional role identity prompt. The experiment also manipulates whether the hypothetical client is of 
lower or higher importance. A total of 53 audit partners provide judgments on a seven-point scale, from “very 
unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0), to capture accounting conservatism. The 
accounting conservatism measure asks, “How likely are you to request management to record an accrual?” Higher 
cell means are indicative of more conservatism. The accounting conservatism cells of the experiment receive 
contrast weights as follows: commercial/lower importance = -3, stakeholder interest/lower importance = +1, 
commercial/higher importance = +1, and stakeholder interest/higher importance = +1. 
* Expectation is directional; p-value is based on a one-tailed equivalent. 
** p-value is based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 2 
Audit Partner - Financial Statement Disclosure Transparency 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Statement Disclosure Transparency 
   
Expanded Financial Statement 
Disclosure 
   
Professional Role Identity 
 
   
Commercial 
Stakeholder 
Interest 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
C
li
en
t 
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p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
Mean 0.83 1.45 1.15 
(Standard deviation) (1.89) (2.06) (1.96) 
Sample size 12 13 25 
Cell A B 
 
    
H
ig
h
er
     Mean 0.38 0.44 0.41 
(Standard deviation) (2.00) (2.23) (2.08) 
Sample size 14 14 28 
Cell C D 
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Mean 0.58 0.92 0.76 
 
(Standard deviation) (1.93) (2.17) (2.04) 
 
Sample size 26 27 53 
 
 
    
Panel B: Basic ANOVA Model of Financial Statement Disclosure Transparency 
  
Expanded Financial 
Statement Disclosure 
Source df MS F p-value** 
Professional Role Identity 1 1.52 0.36 0.552 
Client Importance 1 7.00 1.66 0.204 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 1.05 0.25 0.620 
Error 49 4.22     
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Audit Partner - Financial Statement Disclosure Transparency 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Simple Main Effect Tests for Financial Statement 
Disclosure Transparency 
  
Expanded Financial 
Statement Disclosure 
Source df F p-value 
Overall Test: 
   
  Audit partners will allow the least transparent client financial 
  statement disclosure when a commercial professional role identity 
  is salient and client importance is lower when compared to all other 
  conditions. 
  Contrast weights (-3, +1, +1, +1)* 
 
1,49 0.01 0.458 
Follow-up Simple Effect Tests:    
  Effect of professional role identity given lower client importance 
  [B - A]* 
1,49 0.57 0.227 
  Effect of client importance given commercial professional role 
  identity [C - A]* 
1,49 0.27 0.292 
  Effect of client importance given stakeholder interest professional 
  role identity [D - B]** 
1,49 1.63 0.208 
  Effect of professional role identity given higher client importance 
  [C -D]** 
1,49 0.01 0.942 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics, ANOVA, contrast-coded ANOVA, and simple main effect tests for the 
primary measure used in my experiment to capture audit executives’ client financial statement disclosure 
transparency. The experiment manipulates whether participants are subjected to a commercial or a stakeholder 
interest professional role identity prompt. The experiment also manipulates whether the hypothetical client is of 
lower or higher importance. A total of 53 audit partners provide judgments on a seven-point scale, from “very 
unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0), to capture financial statement disclosure 
transparency. The disclosure transparency measure asks, “How likely are you to request management to disclose 
relevant details about the nature of the contingency that go well above and beyond the bare essentials required for 
compliance purposes?” Higher cell means are indicative of more transparency. The disclosure transparency cells of 
the experiment receive contrast weights as follows: commercial/lower importance = -3, stakeholder interest/lower 
importance = +1, commercial/higher importance = +1, and stakeholder interest/higher importance = +1. 
* Expectation is directional; p-value is based on a one-tailed equivalent. 
** p-value is based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 3 
Audit Partner - Tests of Research Questions about Accounting Recognition and Disclosure 
Transparency 
 
Panel A: Number of Participants Selecting a Financial Reporting Preference 
 
    
Likelihood of Requesting 
Expanded Financial Statement 
Disclosure 
  
 
Likely Unlikely 
L
ik
el
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o
d
 o
f 
R
eq
u
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ti
n
g
 
A
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l 
R
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g
n
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Likely 28 16 
Unlikely 6 0 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Financial Reporting Preference 
  Chi-square p-value** 
Accrual Recognition x Expanded Financial Statement Disclosure 3.21 0.073 
 
    
Table 3 presents audit executives’ financial reporting preference by count of number of participants and an analysis 
of financial reporting preference. The experiment manipulates whether participants are subjected to a commercial or 
a stakeholder interest professional role identity prompt. The experiment also manipulates whether the hypothetical 
client is of lower or higher importance. A total of 53 audit partners provide judgments on a seven-point scale from 
“very unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). Participants are categorized based on 
whether their responses were positive (likely) or negative (unlikely) on the seven-point likelihood scales for each 
measure. Three participants were not included: one participant indicated undecided accrue/unlikely expand 
disclosure, one participant indicated undecided accrue/likely expand disclosure, and one participant indicated 
undecided accrue/undecided expand disclosure. 
** p-value is based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4 
Audit Senior - Accounting Conservatism 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Accounting Conservatism 
 
   
Accrual Recognition 
   
Professional Role Identity 
   
   
Commercial 
Stakeholder 
Interest 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
Control 
C
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t 
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o
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n
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L
o
w
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Mean 1.45 1.70 1.57 
 
1.35 
(Standard deviation) (1.40) (1.19) (1.30) 
 
(1.57) 
Sample size 24 23 47 
 
24 
Cell A B 
  
C 
      
H
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h
er
       Mean 1.46 1.77 1.62  
1.70 
(Standard deviation) (1.70) (1.38) (1.54) 
 
(1.41) 
Sample size 24 24 48 
 
24 
Cell D E 
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Mean 1.46 1.73 1.59 
 
1.52 
 
(Standard deviation) (1.54) (1.28) (1.42) 
 
(1.49) 
 
Sample size 48 47 95 
 
48 
 
   
    
Panel B: Basic ANOVA Model of Accounting Conservatism 
 
  Accrual Recognition 
Source df MS F p-value** 
Professional Role Identity 1 1.82 0.89 0.349 
Client Importance 1 0.05 0.02 0.882 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 0.02 0.01 0.915 
Error 91 2.05     
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Table 4 (cont.) 
Audit Senior - Accounting Conservatism 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Simple Main Effect Tests for Accounting 
Conservatism 
  Accrual Recognition 
Source df F p-value 
Overall Test: 
   
  Audit seniors will allow the least conservative client accounting 
  when a commercial professional role identity is salient and client 
  importance is lower when compared to all other conditions. 
  Contrast weights (-3, +1, +1, +1)* 
 
1,91 0.33 0.285 
Follow-up Simple Effect Tests: 
   
  Effect of professional role identity given lower client importance 
  [B - A]* 
1,91 0.35 0.279 
  Effect of client importance given commercial professional role 
  identity [D - A]* 
1,91 0.00 0.488 
  Effect of client importance given stakeholder interest professional 
  role identity [E - B]** 
1,91 0.03 0.858 
  Effect of professional role identity given higher client importance  
  [D - E]** 
1,91 0.56 0.458 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics, ANOVA, contrast-coded ANOVA, and simple main effect tests for the 
primary measure used in my experiment to capture audit seniors’ client accounting conservatism (e.g., accrual 
recognition). The experiment manipulates whether participants are subjected to a commercial or a stakeholder 
interest professional role identity prompt. The experiment also manipulates whether the hypothetical client is of 
lower or higher importance. A total of 143 audit seniors provide judgments on a seven-point scale, from “very 
unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0), used to capture accounting conservatism. The 
accounting conservatism measure asks, “How likely are you to recommend that management record an accrual?” 
Higher cell means are indicative of more conservatism. The accounting conservatism cells of the experiment receive 
contrast weights as follows: commercial/lower importance = -3, stakeholder interest/lower importance = +1, 
commercial/higher importance = +1, and stakeholder interest/higher importance = +1. 
* Expectation is directional; p-value is based on a one-tailed equivalent. 
** p-value is based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 5 
Audit Senior - Financial Statement Disclosure Transparency 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Statement Disclosure Transparency 
 
   
Expanded Financial Statement Disclosure 
   
Professional Role Identity 
   
   
Commercial 
Stakeholder 
Interest 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
Control 
C
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t 
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p
o
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n
ce
 
L
o
w
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Mean 0.44 1.53 0.97 
 
1.01 
(Standard deviation) (1.60) (1.65) (1.70) 
 
(1.97) 
Sample size 24 23 47 
 
24 
Cell A B 
  
C 
      
H
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h
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       Mean 0.72 0.94 0.83  
1.03 
(Standard deviation) (2.05) (1.64) (1.84) 
 
(1.95) 
Sample size 24 24 48 
 
24 
Cell D E 
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Mean 0.58 1.23 0.90 
 
1.02 
 
(Standard deviation) (1.83) (1.66) (1.77) 
 
(1.94) 
 
Sample size 48 47 95 
 
48 
 
 
      
Panel B: Basic ANOVA Model of Financial Statement Disclosure Transparency 
  
Expanded Financial 
Statement Disclosure 
Source df MS F p-value** 
Professional Role Identity 1 10.18 3.33 0.071 
Client Importance 1 0.60 0.20 0.659 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 4.47 1.46 0.230 
Error 91 3.06     
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Table 5 (cont.) 
Audit Senior - Financial Statement Disclosure Transparency 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Simple Main Effect Tests for Financial Statement 
Disclosure Transparency 
  
Expanded Financial 
Statement Disclosure 
Source df F p-value 
Overall Test: 
   
  Audit seniors will allow the least transparent client financial 
  statement disclosure when a commercial professional role identity 
  is salient and client importance is lower when compared to all other 
  conditions. 
  Contrast weights (-3, +1, +1, +1)* 
 
1,91 2.25 0.068 
Follow-up Simple Effect Tests:    
  Effect of professional role identity given lower client importance 
  [B - A]* 
1,91 4.56 0.018 
  Effect of client importance given commercial professional role 
  identity [D - A]* 
1,91 0.30 0.294 
  Effect of client importance given stakeholder interest professional 
  role identity [E - B]** 
1,91 1.35 0.248 
  Effect of professional role identity given higher client importance  
  [D - E]** 
1,91 0.19 0.663 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics, ANOVA, contrast-coded ANOVA, and simple main effect tests for the 
primary measure used in my experiment to capture audit seniors’ client financial statement disclosure transparency. 
The experiment manipulates whether participants are subjected to a commercial or a stakeholder interest 
professional role identity prompt or none. The experiment also manipulates whether the hypothetical client is of 
lower or higher importance. A total of 143 audit seniors provide judgments on a seven-point scale, from “very 
unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0),  to capture financial statement disclosure 
transparency. The disclosure transparency measure asks, “How likely are you to recommend that management 
disclose relevant details about the nature of the contingency that go well above and beyond the bare essentials 
required for compliance purposes?” Higher cell means are indicative of more transparency. The disclosure 
transparency cells of the experiment receive contrast weights as follows: commercial/lower importance = -3, 
stakeholder interest/lower importance = +1, commercial/higher importance = +1, and stakeholder interest/higher 
importance = +1. 
* Expectation is directional; p-value is based on a one-tailed equivalent. 
** p-value is based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 6 
Audit Partner and Audit Senior Comparison 
 
Panel A: Basic ANOVA Model of Audit Partner and Audit Senior Accounting Conservatism and Financial Statement Disclosure 
Transparency 
  Accrual Recognition 
Expanded Financial 
Statement Disclosure 
Source df MS F p-value df MS F p-value 
Auditor Rank 1 0.43 0.21 0.646 1 0.62 0.18 0.673 
Professional Role Identity 1 3.12 1.53 0.218 1 8.38 2.42 0.122 
Client Importance 1 0.92 0.45 0.504 1 6.68 1.93 0.167 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity 1 0.02 0.01 0.915 1 0.85 0.24 0.622 
Auditor Rank x Client Importance 1 0.49 0.24 0.624 1 2.75 0.79 0.374 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 5.03 2.47 0.119 1 4.35 1.26 0.265 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 5.88 2.89 0.092 1 0.20 0.06 0.812 
Error 140 2.04     140 3.46     
Table 6 presents an ANOVA model for Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity x Client Importance for the two primary dependent measures. The experiment 
manipulates whether participants are subjected to a commercial or a stakeholder interest professional role identity prompt. The experiment also manipulates 
whether the hypothetical client is of lower or higher importance. A total of 95 audit seniors and 53 audit partners provide judgments on an accounting 
conservatism measure asking “How likely are you to request (recommend) that management record an accrual?” on a seven-point scale, from “very unlikely” (-3) 
to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). Participants also respond to a financial statement disclosure transparency measure asking, “How likely are 
you to request (recommend) that management disclose relevant details about the nature of the contingency that go well above and beyond the bare essentials 
required for compliance purposes?” on a seven-point scale, from “very unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). All p-values are 
based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 7 
Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
 
   
Audit Partner - Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
   
Accuracy Goals 
 
Directional Goals 
   
Professional Role Identity 
  
Professional Role Identity 
 
   
Commercial 
Stakeholder 
Interest 
Across 
Professional 
Role 
Identity 
 
Commercial 
Stakeholder 
Interest 
Across 
Professional 
Role 
Identity 
C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
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a
n
ce
 
L
o
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er
  
   
 
   
Mean 5.07 5.47 5.28 
 
1.87 1.88 1.87 
(Standard deviation) (1.80) (1.21) (1.50) 
 
(1.23) (0.66) (0.96) 
Sample size 12 13 25 
 
12 13 25 
    
 
   
H
ig
h
er
         Mean 5.94 6.39 6.16 
 
2.46 2.01 2.24 
(Standard deviation) (1.06) (0.71) (0.91) 
 
(1.11) (0.83) (0.99) 
Sample size 14 14 28 
 
14 14 28 
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Mean 5.54 5.94 5.75 
 
2.19 1.94 2.06 
 
(Standard deviation) (1.49) (1.07) (1.30) 
 
(1.19) (0.74) (0.98) 
 
Sample size 26 27 53 
 
26 27 53 
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Table 7 (cont.) 
Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
 
Panel A (cont.): Descriptive Statistics of Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
 
   
Audit Senior - Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
   
Accuracy Goals 
 
Directional Goals 
   
Professional Role Identity 
  
Professional Role Identity 
 
   
Commercial 
Stakeholder 
Interest 
Across 
Professional 
Role 
Identity 
 
Commercial 
Stakeholder 
Interest 
Across 
Professional 
Role 
Identity 
C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
 
   
Mean 5.13 5.46 5.29 
 
3.31 3.61 3.46 
(Standard deviation) (1.51) (1.07) (1.32) 
 
(1.53) (1.70) (1.60) 
Sample size 24 22 46 
 
24 22 46 
    
 
   
H
ig
h
er
         Mean 5.69 5.25 5.47 
 
3.68 2.83 3.25 
(Standard deviation) (1.40) (1.84) (1.64) 
 
(1.57) (1.41) (1.54) 
Sample size 24 24 48 
 
24 24 46 
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Mean 5.41 5.35 5.38 
 
3.49 3.21 3.35 
 
(Standard deviation) (1.47) (1.51) (1.48) 
 
(1.54) (1.59) (1.56) 
 
Sample size 48 46 94 
 
48 46 48 
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Table 7 (cont.) 
Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
 
Panel B: Basic ANOVA Model of Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
 
 
Audit Partner Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
  Accuracy Goals Directional Goals 
Source df MS F p-value df MS F p-value 
Professional Role Identity 1 2.36 1.55 0.219 1 0.66 0.69 0.411 
Client Importance 1 10.60 6.98 0.011 1 1.75 1.82 0.183 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 0.01 0.00 0.953 1 0.72 0.75 0.390 
Error 49 1.52     49 0.96     
         
 
Audit Senior Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
  Accuracy Goals Directional Goals 
Source df MS F p-value df MS F p-value 
Professional Role Identity 1 0.06 0.03 0.873 1 1.71 0.71 0.402 
Client Importance 1 0.75 0.34 0.563 1 1.02 0.42 0.516 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 3.53 1.59 0.211 1 7.66 3.18 0.078 
Error 90 2.23     90 2.41     
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Table 7 (cont.) 
Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
 
Panel B (cont.): Basic ANOVA Model of Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
 
 
Commitment to Accuracy and Directional Goals 
  Accuracy Goals Directional Goals 
Source df MS F p-value df MS F p-value 
Auditor Rank 1 3.74 1.89 0.171 1 57.53 30.28 <0.001 
Professional Role Identity 1 1.18 0.60 0.442 1 2.06 1.08 0.300 
Client Importance 1 9.76 4.94 0.028 1 0.20 0.11 0.744 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity 1 1.88 0.95 0.331 1 0.02 0.01 0.921 
Auditor Rank x Client Importance 1 4.35 2.20 0.140 1 2.77 1.46 0.229 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 1.14 0.58 0.448 1 5.47 2.88 0.092 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 1.41 0.71 0.400 1 0.96 0.51 0.478 
Error 139 1.98     139 1.90     
Table 7 presents audit partner and audit senior descriptive statistics and ANOVA for commitment to accuracy and directional goals. Commitment to accuracy 
goals asks, “How costly would it be to your career if you did not request Basepoint to modify their preferred accounting treatment and a material misstatement 
was later revealed?” on a seven-point scale from “not at all costly” (1) to “very costly” (7) and centered on “moderately costly” (4). Commitment to directional 
goals asks, “How costly would it be to your career if you requested Basepoint to do something management deemed undesirable and the firm lost the client over 
the disagreement?” on a seven-point scale from “not at all costly” (1) to “very costly” (7) and centered on “moderately costly” (4). The experiment manipulates 
whether participants are subjected to a commercial or a stakeholder interest professional role identity prompt. The experiment also manipulates whether the 
hypothetical client is of lower or higher importance. All p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 8 
Professional Skepticism - Beliefs 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Professional Skepticism - Beliefs 
 
   
Audit Partner - Professional Skepticism - Beliefs 
   
Misstatement Risk 
 
Reasonableness 
 
Mgmt Competence 
   
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
   
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
 
   
 
   
Mean 4.75 5.48 5.15 
 
-1.10 -1.45 -1.29 
 
3.57 3.85 3.72 
(Standard deviation) (1.39) (1.10) (1.27) 
 
(1.16) (1.20) (1.17) 
 
(1.33) (1.46) (1.38) 
Sample size 11 13 24 
 
11 13 24 
 
11 13 24 
    
 
   
 
   
H
ig
h
er
             Mean 5.21 5.11 5.16 
 
-1.21 -1.21 -1.21 
 
3.76 3.37 3.57 
(Standard deviation) (1.30) (1.58) (1.42) 
 
(0.96) (1.30) (1.12) 
 
(0.95) (0.76) (0.87) 
Sample size 14 14 28 
 
14 14 28 
 
14 13 27 
    
 
   
 
   
 
A
cr
o
ss
 C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
Mean 5.01 5.29 5.15 
 
-1.16 -1.33 -1.25 
 
3.68 3.61 3.64 
 
(Standard deviation) (1.33) (1.36) (1.34) 
 
(1.03) (1.23) (1.13) 
 
(1.11) (1.17) (1.13) 
 
Sample size 25 27 52 
 
25 27 53 
 
25 26 51 
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Table 8 (cont.) 
Professional Skepticism – Beliefs 
 
Panel A (cont.): Descriptive Statistics of Professional Skepticism - Beliefs 
 
 
  
Audit Senior - Professional Skepticism - Beliefs 
   
Misstatement Risk 
 
Reasonableness 
 
Mgmt Competence 
   
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
   
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
 
   
 
   
Mean 4.65 5.18 4.91 
 
-0.70 -1.08 -0.89 
 
4.16 3.61 3.89 
(Standard deviation) (1.48) (1.40) (1.45) 
 
(1.53) (1.28) (1.41) 
 
(1.16) (1.04) (1.13) 
Sample size 24 23 47 
 
24 23 47 
 
24 23 47 
    
 
   
 
   
H
ig
h
er
             Mean 5.18 4.83 5.00 
 
-0.83 -0.80 -0.82 
 
3.25 3.86 3.55 
(Standard deviation) (1.12) (1.25) (1.19) 
 
(1.38) (1.45) (1.40) 
 
(1.15) (0.98) (1.10) 
Sample size 24 24 48 
 
24 24 48 
 
24 24 48 
    
 
   
 
   
 
A
cr
o
ss
 C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
Mean 4.91 5.00 4.95 
 
-0.76 -0.94 -0.85 
 
3.70 3.74 3.72 
 
(Standard deviation) (1.32) (1.32) (1.32) 
 
(1.44) (1.36) (1.40) 
 
(1.23) (1.01) (1.12) 
 
Sample size 48 47 95 
 
48 47 95 
 
48 47 95 
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Table 8 (cont.) 
Professional Skepticism – Beliefs 
 
Panel B: Basic ANOVA Model of Professional Skepticism – Beliefs 
 
 
Professional Skepticism - Beliefs 
  Misstatement Risk Reasonableness Mgmt Competence 
Source df MS F p-value df MS F p-value df MS F p-value 
Auditor Rank 1 1.10 0.62 0.433 1 5.10 2.87 0.092 1 0.22 0.18 0.673 
Professional Role Identity 1 1.39 0.78 0.377 1 1.02 0.58 0.449 1 0.01 0.00 0.947 
Client Importance 1 0.14 0.08 0.777 1 0.14 0.08 0.776 1 1.88 1.53 0.218 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity 1 0.41 0.23 0.632 1 0.00 0.00 0.994 1 0.06 0.05 0.818 
Auditor Rank x Client Importance 1 0.01 0.01 0.930 1 0.00 0.00 0.976 1 0.28 0.23 0.632 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 6.05 3.41 0.067 1 1.23 0.69 0.407 1 0.52 0.42 0.517 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity x 
Client Importance 
1 0.01 0.01 0.938 1 0.01 0.01 0.936 1 6.86 5.59 0.019 
Error 139 1.77     139 1.77     138 1.23     
Table 8 presents audit partner and audit senior descriptive statistics and ANOVA for three belief measures of professional skepticism. Measure #1 asks, “How 
would you assess the risk that Basepoint's financial statements are materially misstated when using management's preferred accounting treatment?” on a seven-
point scale from “low” (1) to “high” (7), and centered on “moderate” (4). Measure #2 asks, “How reasonable is management's preferred accounting treatment?” 
on a seven-point scale from “very unreasonable” (-3) to “very reasonable” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). Measure #3 asks, “Based on the brief 
information provided in the case, how would you rate management's competence?” on a seven-point scale from “very low” (1) to “very high” (7) and centered on 
“undecided” (4). The experiment manipulates whether participants are subjected to a commercial or a stakeholder interest professional role identity prompt. The 
experiment also manipulates whether the hypothetical client is of lower or higher importance. All p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 9 
Professional Skepticism – Feelings 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Professional Skepticism - Feelings 
 
   Audit Partner - Professional Skepticism - Feelings  
   
Misstatement Worry 
 
Evidence Sufficiency Worry 
 
   
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
   
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
 
   
 Mean 4.87 5.48 5.20 
 
4.95 5.62 5.31 
 (Standard deviation) (1.46) (1.15) (1.31) 
 
(1.67) (1.35) (1.51) 
 
   
Sample size 11 13 24 
 
11 13 24 
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
H
ig
h
er
          
   
Mean 5.59 4.85 5.22 
 
5.64 4.80 5.22 
 
   
(Standard deviation) (1.04) (1.89) (1.55) 
 
(0.90) (1.88) (1.51) 
 
   
Sample size 14 14 28 
 
14 14 28 
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
 
A
cr
o
ss
 C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
   
 
   
 
 
   
 
Mean 5.28 5.16 5.21 
 
5.33 5.20 5.26 
 
   
 
(Standard deviation) (1.27) (1.58) (1.43) 
 
(1.31) (1.67) (1.49) 
 
   
 
Sample size 25 27 52 
 
25 27 52 
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Table 9 (cont.) 
Professional Skepticism – Feelings 
 
Panel A (cont.): Descriptive Statistics of Professional Skepticism – Feelings 
 
   Audit Senior - Professional Skepticism - Feelings  
   
Misstatement Worry 
 
Evidence Sufficiency Worry 
 
   
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
   
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
 
   
 Mean 4.86 5.28 5.07 
 
4.86 4.93 4.89 
 (Standard deviation) (1.29) (1.51) (1.40) 
 
(1.25) (1.48) (1.35) 
 
   
Sample size 24 23 47 
 
24 23 47 
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
H
ig
h
er
          
   
Mean 5.28 5.12 5.20 
 
5.21 5.24 5.22 
 
   
(Standard deviation) (1.23) (1.25) (1.23) 
 
(1.32) (1.08) (1.19) 
 
   
Sample size 24 24 48 
 
24 24 48 
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
 
A
cr
o
ss
 C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
   
 
   
 
 
   
 
Mean 5.07 5.20 5.13 
 
5.03 5.09 5.06 
 
   
 
(Standard deviation) (1.26) (1.37) (1.31) 
 
(1.29) (1.28) (1.28) 
 
   
 
Sample size 48 47 95 
 
48 47 95 
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Table 9 (cont.) 
Professional Skepticism – Feelings 
 
Panel B: Basic ANOVA Model of Professional Skepticism – Feelings 
 
 Professional Skepticism - Feelings 
  Misstatement Worry Evidence Sufficiency Worry 
Source df MS F p-value df MS F p-value 
Auditor Rank 1 0.14 0.08 0.783 1 1.25 0.68 0.412 
Professional Role Identity 1 0.03 0.02 0.893 1 0.01 0.00 0.948 
Client Importance 1 0.24 0.13 0.721 1 0.58 0.32 0.575 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity 1 0.32 0.17 0.680 1 0.14 0.07 0.787 
Auditor Rank x Client Importance 1 0.06 0.03 0.861 1 1.32 0.71 0.400 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 7.83 4.24 0.041 1 5.03 2.72 0.102 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity x 
Client Importance 
1 1.24 0.67 0.413 1 4.54 2.45 0.120 
Error 139 1.85   139 1.85   
Table 9 presents audit partner and audit senior descriptive statistics and ANOVA for two feeling measures of professional skepticism. Measure #1 asks, “How 
worried are you that the financial statements are misstated if Basepoint uses their preferred accounting treatment (i.e., to not record an accrual and to disclose a 
minimally acceptable level of detail about the nature of the contingency in the notes to the financial statements)?” on a seven-point scale from “not at all 
worried” (1) to “very worried” (7) and centered on “moderately worried” (4). Measure #2 asks, “How worried are you that the evidence supporting 
management’s preferred accounting treatment is not sufficient to support their conclusion?” on a seven-point scale from “not at all worried” (1) to “very worried” 
(7) and centered on “moderately worried” (4).The experiment manipulates whether participants are subjected to a commercial or a stakeholder interest 
professional role identity prompt. The experiment also manipulates whether the hypothetical client is of lower or higher importance. All p-values are based on 
two-tailed tests. 
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Table 10 
Professional Skepticism - Actions 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Professional Skepticism - Actions 
 
   
Audit Partner - Professional Skepticism - Actions 
   
Seek Additional Evidence 
 
Consult with Others 
 
Discuss with Audit 
Committee 
   
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
   
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
 
   
 
   
Mean 2.84 2.76 2.80 
 
2.33 2.18 2.25 
 
2.83 2.61 2.72 
(Standard deviation) (0.30) (0.42) (0.36) 
 
(1.22) (0.93) (1.06) 
 
(0.37) (0.76) (0.61) 
Sample size 12 13 25 
 
12 13 25 
 
12 13 25 
    
 
   
 
   
H
ig
h
er
             Mean 2.86 2.76 2.81 
 
2.36 2.31 2.33 
 
2.36 2.67 2.52 
(Standard deviation) (0.53) (0.50) (0.51) 
 
(0.84) (0.88) (0.85) 
 
(1.15) (0.43) (0.87) 
Sample size 14 14 28 
 
14 14 28 
 
14 14 28 
    
 
   
 
   
 
A
cr
o
ss
 C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
Mean 2.85 2.76 2.80 
 
2.35 2.24 2.29 
 
2.58 2.64 2.61 
 
(Standard deviation) (0.43) (0.45) (0.44) 
 
(1.01) (0.89) (0.94) 
 
(0.90) (0.60) (0.75) 
 
Sample size 26 27 53 
 
26 27 53 
 
26 27 53 
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Table 10 (cont.) 
Professional Skepticism – Actions 
 
Panel A (cont.): Descriptive Statistics of Professional Skepticism - Actions 
 
 
  
Audit Senior - Professional Skepticism - Actions 
   
Seek Additional Evidence 
 
Consult with Others 
 
Discuss with Audit 
Committee 
   
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
   
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
 
   
 
   
Mean 2.66 1.91 2.29 
 
2.26 1.67 1.97 
 
1.52 1.33 1.43 
(Standard deviation) (0.48) (1.41) (1.10) 
 
(0.79) (1.50) (1.22) 
 
(1.25) (1.68) (1.46) 
Sample size 24 23 47 
 
24 23 47 
 
24 23 47 
    
 
   
 
   
H
ig
h
er
             Mean 2.56 2.40 2.48 
 
2.30 2.23 2.27 
 
1.68 1.60 1.64 
(Standard deviation) (0.60) (0.70) (0.65) 
 
(0.72) (1.27) (1.02) 
 
(1.14) (1.15) (1.13) 
Sample size 24 24 48 
 
24 24 48 
 
24 24 48 
    
 
   
 
   
 
A
cr
o
ss
 C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
Mean 2.61 2.16 2.39 
 
2.28 1.96 2.12 
 
1.60 1.46 1.53 
 
(Standard deviation) (0.54) (1.12) (0.90) 
 
(0.75) (1.40) (1.13) 
 
(1.19) (1.42) (1.30) 
 
Sample size 48 47 95 
 
48 47 95 
 
48 47 95 
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Table 10 (cont.) 
Professional Skepticism – Actions 
 
Panel B: Basic ANOVA Model of Professional Skepticism – Actions 
 
 
Professional Skepticism - Actions 
  Seek Additional Evidence Consult with Others 
Discuss with Audit 
Committee 
Source df MS F p-value df MS F p-value df MS F p-value 
Auditor Rank 1 6.03 10.79 0.001 1 1.05 0.93 0.337 1 40.21 30.21 <0.001 
Professional Role Identity 1 2.54 4.55 0.035 1 1.60 1.41 0.237 1 0.08 0.06 0.804 
Client Importance 1 0.35 0.62 0.432 1 1.20 1.05 0.307 1 0.00 0.00 0.977 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity 1 1.14 2.05 0.155 1 0.44 0.39 0.533 1 0.27 0.21 0.651 
Auditor Rank x Client Importance 1 0.31 0.55 0.458 1 0.42 0.37 0.546 1 1.47 1.11 0.295 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 0.69 1.23 0.269 1 0.82 0.72 0.398 1 0.88 0.66 0.418 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity x 
Client Importance 
1 0.79 1.41 0.237 1 0.35 0.31 0.579 1 0.38 0.28 0.596 
Error 140 0.56     140 1.14     140 1.33     
Table 10 presents audit partner and audit senior descriptive statistics and ANOVA for three action measures of professional skepticism. Measure #1 asks, “How 
likely are you to take the following action: seek additional evidence and/or explanation from Basepoint's management?” on a seven-point scale from “very 
unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). Measure #2 asks, “How likely are you to take the following action: consult (recommend 
consultation) with a technical partner or your firm’s professional practice group regarding the accounting issue?” on a seven-point scale from “very unlikely” (-3) 
to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). Measure #3 asks, “How likely are you to take the following action: Bring (Recommend bringing) the 
accounting issue up with the audit committee?” on a seven-point scale from “very unlikely” (-3) to “very likely” (+3) and centered on “undecided” (0). The 
experiment manipulates whether participants are subjected to a commercial or a stakeholder interest professional role identity prompt. The experiment also 
manipulates whether the hypothetical client is of lower or higher importance. All p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 11 
Perceptions of Client Pressure 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Client Pressure 
 
   Audit Partner – Perceptions of Client Pressure  
   
Mgmt in Position to Penalize 
 
Mgmt and Auditor Interests 
Conflict 
 
   
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
   
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
 
   
 Mean 1.27 1.17 1.22 
 
0.98 1.57 1.28 
 (Standard deviation) (2.02) (1.77) (1.85) 
 
(1.46) (0.87) (1.20) 
 
   
Sample size 12 13 25 
 
12 13 25 
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
H
ig
h
er
          
   
Mean 0.53 -0.15 0.19 
 
0.85 1.13 0.99 
 
   
(Standard deviation) (1.80) (1.58) (1.70) 
 
(1.71) (1.13) (1.43) 
 
   
Sample size 14 14 28 
 
14 14 28 
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
 
A
cr
o
ss
 C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
   
 
   
 
 
   
 
Mean 0.87 0.49 0.67 
 
0.91 1.34 1.13 
 
   
 
(Standard deviation) (1.90) (1.77) (1.83) 
 
(1.57) (1.02) (1.32) 
 
   
 
Sample size 26 27 53 
 
26 27 53 
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Table 11 (cont.) 
Perceptions of Client Pressure 
 
Panel A (cont.): Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Client Pressure 
 
   Audit Senior - Perceptions of Client Pressure  
   
Mgmt in Position to Penalize 
 
Mgmt and Auditor Interests 
Conflict 
 
   
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
Professional 
Role Identity 
  
   
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C SI 
Across 
Professional 
Role Identity 
 
C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
L
o
w
er
  
   
 
   
 Mean -0.15 -0.62 -0.38 
 
1.31 0.90 1.11 
 (Standard deviation) (2.04) (1.77) (1.90) 
 
(1.49) (1.58) (1.53) 
 
   
Sample size 24 23 47 
 
24 23 47 
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
H
ig
h
er
          
   
Mean -0.14 -0.18 -0.16 
 
1.50 1.50 1.50 
 
   
(Standard deviation) (1.87) (1.83) (1.83) 
 
(1.15) (1.28) (1.20) 
 
   
Sample size 24 24 48 
 
24 24 48 
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
 
A
cr
o
ss
 C
li
en
t 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 
   
 
   
 
 
   
 
Mean -0.14 -0.39 -0.27 
 
1.40 1.21 1.31 
 
   
 
(Standard deviation) (1.94) (1.79) (1.86) 
 
(1.32) (1.45) (1.38) 
 
   
 
Sample size 48 47 95 
 
48 47 95 
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Table 11 (cont.) 
Perceptions of Client Pressure 
 
Panel B: Basic ANOVA Model of Perceptions of Client Pressure 
 
 Perceptions of Client Pressure 
  
Mgmt in Position to 
Penalize 
Mgmt and Auditor 
Interests Conflict 
Source df MS F p-value df MS F p-value 
Auditor Rank 1 32.16 9.41 0.003 1 1.00 0.53 0.466 
Professional Role Identity 1 3.52 1.03 0.312 1 0.46 0.25 0.621 
Client Importance 1 5.50 1.61 0.207 1 0.09 0.05 0.824 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity 1 0.15 0.04 0.836 1 3.48 1.86 0.174 
Auditor Rank x Client Importance 1 13.29 3.89 0.051 1 3.81 2.04 0.155 
Professional Role Identity x Client Importance 1 0.05 0.01 0.905 1 0.02 0.01 0.922 
Auditor Rank x Professional Role Identity x 
Client Importance 
1 2.17 0.63 0.427 1 1.11 0.60 0.442 
Error 140 3.42     140 1.87     
Table 11 presents audit partner and audit senior descriptive statistics and ANOVA for two measures of perceptions of client pressure. Measure #1 asks, “If you 
do not agree with Basepoint's management, they are in a position to penalize you for your behavior” on a seven-point scale from “strongly disagree” (-3) to 
“strongly agree” (+3) and centered on “neither agree nor disagree” (0). The second measure asks, “Client management's interests and your interests as an auditor 
are in conflict in this situation” on a seven-point scale from “strongly disagree” (-3) to “strongly agree” (+3) and centered on “neither agree nor disagree” (0). 
The experiment manipulates whether participants are subjected to a commercial or a stakeholder interest professional role identity prompt. The experiment also 
manipulates whether the hypothetical client is of lower or higher importance. All p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
 
 
 
The following pages provide the experimental instrument exported from Qualtrics. 
Additional information is provided in brackets. 
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APPENDIX B: PROFESSIONAL ROLE IDENTITY FREE RESPONSE DATA 
 
 
The following pages provide free response data from audit partner and audit senior participants 
related to the professional role identity manipulation. The author removed any audit firm 
identifiable information as noted. Participants who did not respond to the free response question 
are excluded. 
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Audit Partner – Professional Role Identity Free Response Data 
 
Partner 
Participant 
Number 
Commercial Stakeholder Interest 
1   Empowerment, responsible. 
2 
A large distribution company put their 
audit out for bid as they believed they 
were outgrowing their current auditor.  
I was part of the pursuit team and 
scheduled to be the lead audit manager.  
We were fortunate enough to win the 
engagement and the opportunity helped 
credentialize me for future business 
development opportunities. 
  
3 
Relationships are key. Excellent client 
service carried the day. Being confident 
in communications makes decision 
makers comfortable 
  
4 
It was a very important client that was 
important (not critical) for me and the 
firm to retain.  Firm leadership was 
active in our proposal efforts. 
  
5 
  I have had a couple of instances where I 
have had to deal with an aggressive 
client and deliver bad/tough messages.  
Looking back, it was difficult at the 
time, but the right thing to do.  Having 
gone through the experience, I am 
better prepared to deal with these 
situations in the future. 
6 
Validated that our services were valued, 
important to maintaining our brand, 
exciting to prevail over the competition 
and provide opportunities for our 
people. 
  
7 
The retention and winning of a client 
was, I believe, critical to my promotion 
to partner.  The business case is an 
essential aspect related to promotion as 
well as advancement.    Also resulted in 
increased self-confidence, validation of  
what I hold most important --integrity 
and "doing the right thing" 
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Partner 
Participant 
Number 
Commercial Stakeholder Interest 
8 
  Although a difficult discussion, 
afterwards felt good to do the right 
thing.  What also helped was feeling 
that my superiors and overall firm was 
behind my decision. Client also was 
happy after a period of time when 
emotions calmed down and also 
determined it was the right thing to do. 
9 
  Difficult discussion with a domineering 
CEO regarding a revenue recognition 
transaction that he thought met the 
criteria to record while the audit partner 
did not.  Created considerable tension 
and possibly put the client relationship 
in jeopardy.  The event was meaningful 
because it showed me to follow your 
own convictions and that the firm 
would support you in whatever way 
necessary including participating in 
those difficult discussions.  Even if 
there are potential negative economic 
ramifications, getting to the right 
answer is the most important thing. 
10 
The experience allowed me to take time 
to develop my personal "theme" of who 
I am professionally.  It allowed me to 
take time to fully develop my 
professional relationships. 
  
11 
  I stood up to a client when having a 
technical discussion over a client's 
deferred tax asset valuation allowance 
whereby our team challenged the 
clients key assumptions on this 
challenging topic.  Several discussions 
followed, including bringing in the 
audit committee, and the best answer 
was arrived at. 
12 
Provided a sense of accomplishment 
personally as well as for the firm. Made 
me proud of what both I and the firm 
can provide for clients. 
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13 
I can think back on several big wins. 
All of them were the result of a lot of 
effort from a lot of people and a lot of 
persistence over a long period of time. 
Most of all, those wins proved to me 
that I could keep up with the older, 
more established partners. It also made 
me realize how much luck was 
involved with such pursuits. 
  
14 
  The firm's reputation was more 
important than the client.  My personal 
reputation was more important than the 
firm or the client.  The client was not 
completely honest in their responses to 
us, therefore my attitude towards them 
changed dramatically. 
15 
  Partner, who was a mentor, was in 
charge of a large public company that I 
worked with him on and which had a 
major financial reporting fraud 
perpetrated by senior management.  
Ultimately, he demonstrated "doing the 
right thing," set the right one with our 
team to make sure we maintained an 
appropriate level of professional 
skepticism and passed on a commonly 
understood theme within the firm that 
no one client, regardless of its 
significance or importance, was too 
significant or important to make other 
than the "right choices" in adhering to 
our professional responsibilities. 
16 
  The individual took the time to clearly 
articulate the rationale for our position 
under the literature, why they would be 
considered aggressive and the risks to 
taking this position. This resulted in an 
agreement with the client to not take 
the position. 
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17 
  The client was one of our most 
significant tax and attest clients, and 
had been a client since well before I 
joined the firm. The owner was 
aggressive, and I dreaded discussing the 
issue with him. I explained the issue 
and let him state his case. After 
justifying my position, we agreed on 
the accounting and disclosures. 
18 
Exhilarating! Sense of 
accomplishment! Relief on retention of 
a client. 
  
19 
  Right thing to do; integrity and quality 
values 
20 
  The client disputed our proposed 
accounting for a transaction and the 
discussions with the client were 
unpleasant as we both held our ground. 
However, as a result of the interactions, 
although the client had been aggressive 
at the time, it was clear upon 
subsequent interactions that I had 
gained the client's respect through the 
interaction based on the fact I stood up 
for what I believed was appropriate 
accounting. 
21 
Particularly rewarding as it was a long 
term pursuit in a new strategic area for 
the firm.  Reaffirmed that our approach 
worked. 
  
22 
  Proud of the fact that we were able to 
talk through matters with client so that 
upon reflection they came to the right 
conclusion without causing any ill will. 
23 
  CAO was demeaning to auditors 
creating a confrontational environment 
for completing the audit.  Had a 
difficult conversation with him to 
address this issue.  Demonstrated my 
professionalism in dealing with an 
unprofessional and negative client. 
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24 
Enabled my career advancement 
Always tried to provide great service; 
concerned about losing client to 
competitors geographically closer to 
my client. 
  
25 
  Had a client that was a non-profit and 
they had all these pledges on the books 
that turned out to be bogus.  Partner 
called them out on it and went to the 
board. Had a client that was 
manipulating the financials by shifting 
income to 2015 and it should of been in 
prior years.  Client was trying to meet 
bank covenant and was being very 
aggressive 
26 
  I computed and reflected a large 
deferred tax liability on the balance 
sheet of a large regional rental car 
agency.  They changed auditors the 
next year and the new auditor ignored 
the issue. 
28 
  Related to ICFR, taking firm stand on 
design/effectiveness of important 
review control - we did not have 
sufficient evidence that the scope of the 
review was adequate to mitigate risks 
and there was not sufficient evidence to 
support its operation.  Related to going 
concern, obtaining sufficient evidence 
from the client to support it continued 
viability. 
29 
  There have been numerous times I have 
encountered situations where we have 
stood up to clients.  Most times, it has 
been resolved in a favorable manner 
once we explain how our responsibility 
is for us to be objective and 
independent.  That is ultimately why 
we were hired. 
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30 
Our firm had a rather large client who 
had a negative experience with one of 
our senior managers.  The senior 
manager was technical, but lacked the 
"people skills" needed to connect with 
this somewhat sensitive client.  We 
removed the senior manager from the 
engagement and replaced him with a 
"warmer" senior manager and the 
relationship was repaired. 
  
31 
One client had a strained relationship 
with the partner on the account which 
hurt the overall relationship between 
the two organizations.  I knew some of 
the people at that client and was put on 
the account to improve the relationship 
and retain the client.  My experience on 
similar clients in terms of industry and 
size enabled us to be selected through 
the RFP process.  My approach and 
style relative to service, expertise and 
relationships resulted in our firm being 
selected as the auditors. 
  
32 
The retention of clients is significantly 
dependent upon the type of service we 
provide, the environment in which a 
client operates, and size of the client.  
Clients who report under government 
audit standards go through various 
audit rotation requirement; and 
accordingly, the retention of those 
clients are more difficult than others in 
the private sector.  Regardless of the 
environment, the key element in 
retention of the client rests in the 
commitment the auditors have in 
properly servicing the client. Clients 
and their representatives can always tell 
immediately when the auditors walk 
into their presence if they are prepared 
or not.  Those of us in practice have 
numerous cases to support what I just 
explained. 
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33 
It validated in my mind how clients 
perceived my capabilities and that I was 
able to portray the technical knowledge 
combined with the relationship building 
to be seen as a trusted advisor.  It was 
the most significant win for me in my 
career and was the largest audit fee in 
the office. 
  
34 
  CEO was main shareholder and had a 
significant financial interest. Company 
was facing a liquidity issue. Many 
uncertainties existed. Time consuming 
and detailed analysis required. 
35 
  Right thing to do. Extremely stressful. 
Ultimately rewarding, personally and 
career-wise. 
36 
The engagement helped us establish our 
industry qualifications at a local level.  
There was team work among several 
offices of the firm.  The revenue was 
important to my book of business. 
  
37 
Relationships were very important, and 
withstood a 30% proposed drop in fees 
from another firm.  It helped me feel 
good that it was because of me that they 
wanted to stay with the firm. 
  
38 
  What I learned from this situation is 
that if we don't stand up for our people 
and our integrity, it demoralizes the 
team and allows for your people to lose 
interest in their jobs because they no 
longer feel valued. 
39 
This is one of the most enjoyable 
aspects of our job.  We take great pride 
in the quality and service we provide 
and winning and retaining works is 
tangible proof that we are indeed 
delivering on these promises. 
  
40 
  Typically this happens on tough 
accounting topics (restatements, 
material misstatements, etc...). 
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41 
We retained a large marquee client in 
our industry - the largest audit client in 
this industry across the firm.  I served 
in the role of senior manager.  I was 
proud that we focused on the high level 
of audit quality and high level of client 
service we provided. 
  
42 
As advisory partner on a particular 
audit engagement, I worked with the 
Audit Engagement Partner to retain an 
important client of the Firm.  The client 
expressed that fees were the primary 
issue leading to the proposal.  I worked 
with management and the Audit 
Committee to determine the underlying 
causes and helped the team in 
addressing these issues along with 
support for our fees.  We were 
successful in retaining the client.  The 
Partner and team felt great with the 
retention and was supportive of making 
their adjustments to address the client's 
needs. 
  
43 
  Release of tension, freedom from 
knowing you did the right thing. 
44 
  1. FS include several management 
estimates which in many cases are not 
reflective of the true economic benefits 
of certain FS items (these include 
inventory reserves, bad debt 
allowances, IBNR self-insurance 
reserves, etc..).  Clients tend to 
underestimate these due to their 
perception that their FS and related 
carrying value or fair value of such 
items are "cleaner" than they really are.  
Clients tend to see their businesses in a 
more positive light because they are 
more invested in the Company and 
don't take an independent and objective 
stance on certain "reserves". 
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45 
Retaining a client relationship - feeling 
proud that some I mentored was able to 
overcome certain obstacles and retain 
the relationship that I had originated.  
Winning work - observing how 
someone I trained was able to "sell" the 
work and close the deal. 
  
46 
Meaningful to my career as it was a 
large client that propelled my status in 
the office and the firm.  In addition, it 
allowed me to work closely with a 
senior manager and mentor her on 
making the next step in her career.  It 
also was a great learning experience for 
me due to the integrity of the CFO and 
the lines of communication I was able 
to open up to him. 
  
47 
Large international engagement, 
incumbent was the auditor for 7 or so 
years, my experience and discussion 
around client service approach seemed 
to make the difference. 
  
48 
  A situation arose after the completion 
of an IPO where we had identified 
fraud during the IPO process. The 
partner on the engagement pursued the 
client relative to this transaction and we 
ultimately resigned from the 
engagement. 
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50 
  As a third year partner, I concluded that 
my client's proposed revenue in a 
quarter was materially in error and 
insisted that the revenue be corrected 
before the press release / form 10-Q 
was released. I was fully aware that the 
consequence of my insistence could 
well be that the client would fire my 
firm.   As a fourth year partner, I 
informed a client and its audit 
committee that revenue should not be 
recognized for a swap of software 
between itself and another company, as 
the transaction lacked economic 
substance. To convince the Company, I 
ultimately had to call the Chair. 
51 
  It was a little scary, as it was a client; I 
felt empowered by my firm to do the 
right thing, I felt good about doing the 
right thing. 
52 
Mentoring is part of our profession. I 
remember coaching about 
understanding the business as a priority 
and to "listen" rather than just selling. 
This is always my constant coaching to 
managers. 
  
53 
  We identified an issue with a particular 
stance a client took on a legal claim.  
The stance was not sufficiently 
supported and the client did not want to 
book the entry to correct the issue.  
However, our team held firm and talked 
through the issue with the client and 
ultimately got them to see it was the 
right thing to do. 
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54 
  The primary example I can recall is 
when a client was pushing a very 
aggressive accounting position prior to 
an IPO. This client, a CFO, was very 
adamant this accounting position was 
necessary to support their business 
model. I pushed back because it was 
not supportable and held my ground 
even though it was a high profile client, 
and ultimately the CFO and board 
agreed. While this was a difficult 
situation, the CFO and I developed a 
very strong relationship built on trust. 
55 
My most memorable experience 
involved a situation where we had to 
change out one of the partners serving 
the client.  Following several misses on 
a tax return we had to fix the team or 
risk losing the client.  This was a 
significant client, high profile client.  
While the items missed were not 
significant, they represented the 
culmination of this client's frustration 
with the existing team.  It was difficult 
to change out the team, but at the end of 
the day we found a much better 
solution for our client. 
  
56 
In the past year, we were successful in 
winning an important new client. The 
win was the result of a two-year pursuit 
where we developed relationships with 
management, and significantly boosted 
my standing. A number of others at my 
firm helped during the two-year 
journey, and I made sure each of them 
received proper credit. 
  
57 
Sense of pride in being selected over 
my competitors-- demonstrating the 
recognition by the client in my 
professional qualifications.  This "win" 
provides the credibility to use in future 
opportunities with other clients. 
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1 
This event would be meaningful to my 
career as it would provide additional 
overall business skills to my resume, 
such as negotiation, business growth 
(developments), as well as help me to 
portray an image to others and to the 
firm that I can add value. 
  
2 
Bidding on a client is something that 1. 
can settle the firm, 2. provide you with 
an opportunity to learn what is 
important to a client in selecting an 
auditor. I've never been involved in 
this, but would be interested in it. 
  
3 
Early in my career, I was the staff 
attending a proposal along with the 
manager and partner for a life sciences 
company. Although my role was 
limited to passing out materials to the 
attendees, it was the first opportunity in 
my career to obtain interaction with 
clients and helped to shape my 
developments. 
  
4 
What it would be like: 1. Stressful 
finding out if the client would be worth 
it 2.be negotiation process and how 
much would we charge 3. is this a value 
added client? 
  
5 
I have yet to come across such an 
experience. Retaining an important or 
any client for that matter brings 
enormous pride and meaning to my 
professional career as if is an indicative 
of success and validation of my 
interaction with the client. 
  
6 
Beneficial to the firm, beneficial to my 
career, good learning experience, take 
what I learned to be able to make the 
next bid better. 
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7 
Research client beforehand, relate tools 
we have to their business/audit needs, 
relate ideas and experiences we have 
that make us the best for the job 
  
8 
Insightful to see how the firm goes after 
revenue. Get to see the temple of 
partners. Who brings clients and who 
maintains existing clients. 
  
9 
While I have not been involved in an 
audit client pursuit I know from 
discussions with my managers that 
there are many involved factors. First, 
engagement/bid fees come into play. 
The firm needs to be competitive in the 
bid, but at the same time not under 
value our services. 
  
12 
Participating on a pursuit team would 
allow me to work with higher ups in the 
firm, and also practice my presentation 
skills. For these reasons I believe it 
would be meaningful to my career. 
  
13 
Timely audit FS delivery, fast 
communication, reasonable fees. 
  
16 
I felt accomplished and is looking 
forward to more of those experiences. 
  
17 
This experience was intense and time-
consuming. 
  
19 
Very important to be sociable and "look 
the part." Everything is a game of 
politics more or less. Nothing is as it 
seems. But it's the most important part 
of this business. 
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20 
It was well planned and thought out at 
the process from understanding the 
client risks to understanding the key 
decision makers (who they knew and 
how it should be leveraged). It was like 
a sales pitch. It is very crucial to the 
professional career, it provides a 
understanding that is not generally 
taught, it also reveals many of soft 
skills that would not be associated with 
generally. 
  
21 
This event would give me the 
opportunity to negotiate with client and 
management. I would be able to learn 
the process behind what acts taken to 
win a client bid 
  
22 
More insight into how (firm name 
removed by author) as a firm markets 
itself to potential clients. Exposure to 
industry-specific clients wants, 
networking. 
  
23 
Demonstrates how the team operates 
and experiences would help complete 
and smooth audit. 
  
24 
Good for the firm, good for my career, 
stress for busy season, learning 
opportunity. 
  
25 
Putting together an initial budget which 
includes all work seems expected. 
Introducing team members to the client 
so they are aware of who they will 
work with. 
  
28 
I have not participated on a team 
actively involved in the bidding 
process, but I know your success in the 
market is a factor in 
manager/director/partner promotions 
and compensation, so I imagine my 
effort would be driven by that. 
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30 
I have never been involved with client 
pursuit, but while on vacation a few 
months ago, a partner from a past 
engagement asked me to join him in a 
meeting to pursue a new client. 
Unfortunately I could not go, but I 
imagine it would have been stressful as 
a senior associate, but extremely 
beneficial to see a "behind the scenes" 
situation unfold. I regret not being able 
to attend because I believe it would 
have been very helpful from a 
professional standpoint to see the 
process, learn, and make myself known 
to leadership as someone who could 
help the firm grow (which would help 
differentiate me from my peers). 
  
31 
This process would require thinking 
outside of the box as similar firms 
would be giving out bids as usual. It 
would mean a lot to my career, 
especially because it would be my 
client from then on. It would be my 
networking skills in the area and my 
name would be more known. 
  
32 
Demonstrating professional sale to 
prospective client; Growth in client 
service acumen. 
  
33 
I am very pleased and proud of my 
accomplishment right now. Being new 
in this country is tough, but the 
fulfillment that it brought is also 
priceless. The challenges that I had 
from my personal life definitely can be 
applied on work as well, that you 
should never give up if you badly 
wanted something. 
  
34 
It would be a great learning experience 
to see what goes on in the background 
in teams of determine audit fees. 
  
35 
Good negotiation skills, learn more 
about my abilities in the process of 
making promises to the client. 
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36 
Learned how to communicate with 
upper management. Learned important 
skills in researching new accounting 
areas. 
  
37 
I have not necessarily worked on a 
client pursuit team, but I believe it 
would be very beneficial to your future 
career path. It would take a lot of 
research and time spent on identifying 
areas in which our firm could benefit 
the client. Through this process, you 
would be able to work on your 
relationship with other members of the 
firm as well as build client relations. 
  
38 
I never participated in the bidding 
process. However, I would like to 
participate and think it is important for 
seniors to get exposure quickly as 
possible in order to excel in this area as 
this is a revenue generator although we 
are a service industry, we need to work 
on our sales skills. it will help build out 
network. 
  
39 
Rewarding to bring in new business. 
Beneficial to build client relationships. 
  
40 
Be attentive to client needs, understand 
client business. 
  
41 
It would be an opportunity to apply 
strategic thinking on how to win an 
important client. Few critical factors 
need to be considered such as fee, 
competitors, risk, what the client is 
working for, etc. I would understand 
what the client is mainly prioritizing 
and try to highlight what our firm has 
to offer to meet it. 
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42 
When assisting with RFPs (Request for 
proposal) it is important to consider the 
background of qualifications of the 
team members and firm. The firm 
should consider the proposed clients 
integrity and professionalism as that is 
key to gaining new clients. 
  
43 
By participating in a client pursuit team 
would be very meaningful to my career. 
It is always good to see the client 
relationship side of auditing and better 
understand our services that we 
provide. Also, it is great exposure to 
firm leadership. 
  
46 Part of the business; takes strategy   
47 
Working around the clock to get 
presentation ready; insight into firm 
researches for presenting to clients, 
nerve wracking. 
  
49 
Not sure, have not been a part of such a 
situation @ (firm name removed by 
author) generally a manager level task. 
  
50 
To expand my experience to help to 
move into next level of career. 
  
51 
As part of a recent proposal process, 
the entity that we were bidding on 
asked specific questions, regarding how 
we, as professionals planned on 
utilizing big data to improve our 
processes. As part of this, given the 
exposure by the management team to 
big data, we were able to win the 
proposal. This has shown me the 
importance of staying up to date on 
where the profession is going and how 
being a leader in technology can boost 
your professional career. 
  
53 
I would imagine that being in this 
position I would feel as if I was making 
a difference to (firm name removed by 
author). 
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55 
  Audit client was questioning our audit 
procedures and why we had to perform 
them. 
57 
  While the client was being very 
persistent, it was important to stand my 
ground due to the nature of the issues; 
it was necessary to get my managers 
included as it was not fully comfortable 
standing up to the client 
58 
  The client was not performing contracts 
it said they were unimportant, but did 
not want a deficiency. They pushed in 
the direction of actions like it was 
completed effectively. We did not 
accept their decision of the control at 
interim and had them implement a new 
control at year end. Bringing this to the 
attention of partner proved I was taking 
control work seriously and thinking 
about the substantial implications. 
59 
  Standing up to a client gave me more 
confidence in myself as an auditor. It 
also helps me learn to not always do 
what the client wants. 
60 
  It was a very uncomfortable situation. 
The manager and the client got into a 
shouting match that I had no 
involvement in, but it was present for 
the disagreement. It made requesting 
information awkward. It was 
meaningful because it showed me that 
not everyone is professional at all 
times. 
61 
  The client was not willing to accept our 
excess bill request as their books 
weren't up to par. The client was angry 
that we were taking so long on the 
audit, when it reality it was because 
their schedules didn’t tie. 
62 
  Reported an accounting manager to the 
CFO because he yelled at auditors 
when we only ask supporting 
documents for the audit. 
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63 
  I believe standing up to someone in a 
difficult situation as outlined above, 
although not easy to stomach but it is 
the right thing to do. I often try to step 
back and envision what the correct 
thing/action to do at the end of the day 
putting cautions aside and this 
generally provides a clear action plan 
when addressing the client 
64 
  I would deal with them with kindness 
because I understand that they are 
stressed 
65 
  Would allow me and develop my 
professional and problem-solving 
skills. Knowing when to escalate 
management. Thinking twice before 
contacting the client. 
66 
  No matter how difficult the 
conversation may be, it is the 
professionally responsible thing to have 
that conversation with the client. 
67 
  Taught me the importance of acting 
responsibly even though it made the 
client unhappy. Helped me earn respect 
from my seniors on the job. 
69 
  You need to assure the clients are 
always acting in an ethical manner. 
Any indication otherwise should be 
reported and further investigated as part 
of the audit. 
70 
  I have not dealt with aggressive clients. 
If it had to do it, it would probably 
involve the lead engagement partner in 
the conversation. 
71 
  There are times in the past when I stood 
up to an aggressive client, but I would 
always consider the right decisions and 
not make an decisions with any 
improper actions 
74 
  The event was difficult, the event 
caused major issues in the audit. 
75   Difficult, stressful 
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76 
  Client tried to out audit fee without 
reasons which could lead to poor audit 
quality. 
78 
  Clients might not initially enjoy the 
challenge but eventually appreciate 
thorough nature of thought process. 
80 
  I was able to talk professionally and 
kept my integrity as high for my 
employer. I gave updates to my 
manager about the situation and how it 
was resolved. 
82 
  Challenging to handle the conversation 
given my junior level relative to the 
years of experience of the client staff, 
received aggression was due to 
unfamiliarity/not understanding the 
request. Re-phrased the auditing 
standard requiring us to request this 
information. 
83 
  I have tried to clearly articulate why we 
must do a particular procedure and let 
them know I understand they are 
frustrated (if it is true) but we must do 
this for xyz reason. 
84 
  A client once accused a member of the 
engagement team of stealing some 
original payroll support because she 
couldn't locate it in her files. I believe 
standing up to the client after this 
accusation would have been the 
professionally responsible thing to do. 
This event would be meaningful to my 
professional career because standing up 
for my staff up to the client builds team 
morale because it shows that I trust, 
care and appreciate the staff. 
85 
  First year client hesitated to provide 
information about the financial 
reporting process as part of our initial 
documentation regarding the reporting 
process. 
135 
 
 
Senior 
Participant 
Number 
Commercial Stakeholder Interest 
86 
  I had a client that wanted/liked to do 
everything according to the standards 
and was adamant in "tailoring" the 
guidance to his interpretation. So for 
financial statement disclosures, I 
directed him to the AICPA investment 
company guide to ensure that we were 
on the same page 
87 
  Primary client is an SEC filer and the 
finance team is composed of many 
aggressive, sarcastic, males. Often 
times during walkthroughs or (firm 
identifiable information removed by 
author) related meetings they will 
attempt to stifle or impede the inquiry 
process with dry sarcasm, refusal, or 
questioning my chosen methodology 
suggesting I may not understand what I 
am doing. Eventually this is resolved 
by matching sarcasm levels and 
stubbornness until the client realizes a 
given point is non-negotiable. This is 
mildly uncomfortable at times. 
88 
  As a senior associate, I was asked by a 
client to provide sensitive information 
on our review timeline (i.e. why we 
could not provide an opinion on a 
restatement more quickly). The 
assistant controller purposely asked for 
this information while our senior 
management (manager/partner) was not 
available, as they had previously asked 
to obtain this information without 
success. I told the client that this 
information was not relevant to them, 
nor was I comfortable providing it 
without first speaking to my manager 
and partners, who informed the client 
they would not take any similar request 
to the senior/staff. 
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89 
  Evaluate clients response their 
reasoning for being aggressive; request 
answers in writing if client disagrees or 
refuses to provide audit requested 
items; discuss matter internally with 
team/manager/partner; consider issue in 
relation to audit as a whole. 
90 
  My client strongly disagreed to provide 
the legal counsel my client hired in 
order to represent them in a legal matter 
where my client was the plaintiff. We 
requested the legal counsel contact 
information to confirm all legal 
disputes involving our client. As a 
result, our client strongly disagreed 
with providing this information. 
However, we explained to our client in 
a respectful and professional manner 
that this procedure was necessary in 
order to complete our audit procedure 
and documentation, with continuous 
disclosure and communication the issue 
was solved. 
92 
  Push back on client on particular topics 
they were unwilling to budge on that 
may have led to potential control 
deficiencies. Spoke about potential 
outcomes if they were not willing to 
listen to advice. 
93 
  The client contact, a past auditor, is 
often aggressive about our audit 
approach, questioning why we are 
requesting or performing procedures. 
During these times, I didn’t match the 
level of hate from the client, but instead 
politely explained and supported why 
we need to perform procedures. I feel 
this is the best approach and I am never 
aggressive back. I informed both my 
manager and my partner of the 
situation. 
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94 
  As our profession is based on our 
professional skepticism, it would be 
very important to stand up to an 
aggressive client. If I didn’t I would 
open myself up to many potential 
questions down the road. If I knew it 
was right to say something, I would 
because that could affect my career and 
life. I've had clients push back on 
request and this always causes me to 
raise questions as to why. Sometimes I 
feel like they are trying to hide things. 
96 
  In the past I have had to deal with an 
aggressive client that was not very 
technical. But was handling a very 
complex transaction. It was very 
difficult to correct her because she 
thought she was correct. I was able to 
research and direct her to the 
appropriate guidance and walk her 
though the transaction with managers 
present. 
97 
  Standing up to the client earned 
respect; showed that our reputation was 
more important than the audit fee. 
98 
  We once come across a situation where 
we suggested to downgrade a credit 
facility. The client refused to do so 
since recognizing any provision would 
have a significant impact on profit, and 
on bonus of management credit/risk 
department as well. We listed all 
negative prospects and persuaded the 
client to do so at last. And finally, the 
credit client did face a difficult facility 
situation. 
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100 
  Last year a client shouted at me and my 
manager because of her lack of 
understanding over fair value hierarchy. 
She didn't know how to "level" 
investment in accordance with the new 
guidance that came out last year and 
thought we should be the ones to 
tell/teach her how to do it. 
101 
  While working on a recent IPO, the 
client became difficult and often tried 
to "bully" team members from asking 
certain questions, or certain requests. 
As the lead senior, it became 
imperative that I stand up to the client 
in tense situations, and not allow them 
to intimidate our team, as that would go 
against our due diligence and 
professional responsibilities. 
102 
  I had discussions with my client 
regarding one of my senior manager's 
comment on the fair value disclosure. I 
wasn't sure on how to deliver the news 
to the client, the client was a little bit 
aggressive. I wish I would be able to 
elaborate more to her without bringing 
my senior manager. 
103 
  In the past year there has been a lot of 
focus on the allowance for loan loss 
estimate on banking clients and 
managements’ methodology. We 
received a lot of push back from clients 
where their number isn’t the issue, but 
how the number was determined. Most 
clients are overly conservative which is 
not U.S. GAAP. It’s hard to get 
management to agree to, in their eyes, a 
logical process to determine the 
estimate. 
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104 
  The client was upset about issues 
arising close to the deadline. He was 
aggressive and rude, even throwing out 
profanity and personal attacks. I was 
able to justify myself though factual 
information and my plan of action. He 
calmed down and apologized. 
105 
  When the client is treating the team 
with disrespect or generally taking 
personal things out on us, I've told them 
they were out of line. 
106 
  It was important for the client to respect 
me and my opinions. We have to audit 
to our professional standards. We 
should not be bullied into giving an 
opinion. 
107 
  I once stood in the client's office as he 
berated me for letting him know that I 
found a misstatement. He asked me 
why I chose to be an auditor. 
 
